Photo: Dodik and Putin in 2024 (WikiMedia Commons)
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Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a dangerous crossroads. Milorad Dodik, president of the Serbian Entity (Republika Srpska, RS) - the smaller of the two entities in the country - is launching a full-scale attack on the constitutional order built after the war. The situation threatens to escalate into a violent conflict between the RS police, loyal to Dodik, and the state institutions. Yet if handled properly, this crisis could also become a turning point towards strengthening Bosnia's fragile rule of law. The role of Europe - and in particular the Netherlands, with its historical responsibility - is crucial here.
What is happening?
Since the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina has functioned as a decentralised, multi-ethnic state divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Entity (RS). For years, Dodik has been systematically undermining the country's sovereignty and constitutional order. He spreads ethnic hatred, glorifies war criminals, denies the Srebrenica genocide, intimidates opponents, and openly seeks secession from RS and unification with neighbouring Serbia.
In July 2023, Dodik escalated his opposition to the authority of the High Representative - currently German former minister Christian Schmidt. Bosnia's state court sued him for refusing to implement his decisions. In February 2025, he was sentenced in first instance to one year in prison and a six-year ban on holding public office. A final verdict is expected within three to six months.
In retaliation, Dodik forced RS institutions to pass laws rejecting the authority of the Constitutional Court, the state judiciary and national law enforcement. He began drafting a new RS constitution aimed at establishing its own army, intelligence service, and the right to secede and join a confederation with Serbia. Although Bosnia's Constitutional Court suspended large parts of this legislation, Dodik and his controlled institutions continue to implement it anyway.
This led to new investigations against Dodik and his allies for subverting the constitutional order. When they refused to appear for questioning, the court issued arrest warrants - but no state authority succeeded in enforcing them. The RS police, under Dodik's control, threatened to use force if arrested.
De facto coup
This de facto coup has brought Bosnian security forces to the brink of violent confrontation - so far only avoided by the restraint of the national police. Across Bosnia, civilians fear the outbreak of violence. Non-Serbs in RS, especially war returnees, are especially vulnerable now that they are no longer protected by national institutions.
Meanwhile, Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Čović is seizing the moment to demand electoral law reforms that would further entrench ethnic divisions. His support for state institutions depends on weakening their multi-ethnic character, accelerating Bosnia's fragmentation.
Regional context
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić openly supports Dodik's separatist agenda, with support from Russia and Hungary. Vučić, facing domestic unrest after the collapse of a train station in Novi Sad in November, maintains his position of power firmly. At the same time, elements within the Croatian government tacitly support nationalist Bosnian Croat leaders, undermining Bosnia's sovereignty.
Despite some progress in reintegration - through trade, visa-free travel and the EU accession process - the Bosnian state structure remains weak. With a less engaged United States under Donald Trump, leadership now rests with the EU.
The High Representative has broad powers: to change laws, suspend constitutions and dismiss officials. But without strong US support and with a divided EU, Schmidt is reluctant to act forcefully. The EU enforcement mission EUFOR Althea has 1,700 troops (including Dutch ones), recently reinforced by another 300, but political support remains limited.
The danger of inaction
Failure to act against Dodik brings the risk of constitutional collapse, strengthening ethnic extremism and armed clashes between security forces - which could open the path to a new conflict. The Netherlands, with its historical role, previously showed leadership by blocking EU accession talks with Serbia in December 2024. Now it must again take the lead.
What should the Netherlands and the EU do?
- Strengthen EU and NATO support to Bosnia's state institutions
- Offer diplomatic support towards Banja Luka, Belgrade, Zagreb and Budapest.
- Provide intelligence and operational support in the event of Dodik's arrest.
- Prepare enforcement of second judgment in Dodik's case.
- Make it clear that Dodik is no longer a legitimate partner in the EU dialogue on Bosnia.
- Support the High Representative and his mandate
- Guarantee full support for Schmidt's authority.
- Let Banja Luka and Belgrade know that as long as Dodik is in power, the EU will support Schmidt in strong action.
- Strengthen the presence of EUFOR Althea
- Increase visibility in RS to protect non-Serb communities and ensure constitutional order.
- Prepare a credible EU or NATO alternative if Russia vetoes renewal of EUFOR's mandate in the UN Security Council-with similar clout to KFOR in Kosovo.
- Put pressure on Serbia and Croatia
- Threaten to suspend economic cooperation with Serbia as long as it supports Dodik separatism.
- Publicly support pro-democracy protests in Serbia.
- Demand from Croatia full respect for Bosnia's sovereignty and EU principles.
- Use EU accession talks to accelerate constitutional reform
- Support the immediate start of EU accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Give the European Commission a mandate for clear reform plans for democracy, rule of law and institutions.
- Make it clear that constitutional reform is a core requirement: towards a functional democracy with accountable institutions and a functioning market economy.
Conclusion
Bosnia is at a tipping point. Despite enormous pressure, the institutions are still functioning. The political opposition in RS opposes Dodik's plans. Nine weeks after the start of his full-scale attack, peace is holding-but it will not last long if Europe remains passive. The EU-and the Netherlands-must act now.