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Source: Macondo
In recent weeks, people around the world have taken to the streets to protest for the rights and autonomy of the Kurdish population in northeastern Syria, known as Rojava. In cities like London, Berlin and Amsterdam, demonstrators filled squares and streets to call on internationals to stop the Syrian regime's growing pressure and not let autonomy disappear. But what exactly is going on in Rojava and why have tensions between the Kurds and the Syrian state reignited in recent weeks?
A shaky ceasefire
After an offensive in January and a shaky ceasefire, there seemed to be an opening for pacification in north-eastern Syria in early 2026. On January 30, there was concluded an agreement that should lead to a permanent ceasefire and integration of Kurdish security forces and local administration units into national state structures. On paper this sounds like stabilisation, but in practice the agreement makes it painfully clear where the fault line really runs.
On one side is the interim authority in Damascus under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, which wants to re-centralise the state: one army, one security apparatus and one hierarchy for legislation and governance. Damascus claims that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have de facto military control over Rojava, along with regional administrations, be fully incorporated into state institutions. This is a classic state-building strategy after years of civil war.
On the other side is the Rojava project, formally the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES), with a political model that instead relies on decentralisation and local governance. Their so-called Social Contract emphasises multilingualism, gender equality, local councils and communes, and a democratic philosophy that departs from the Damascus territorial model.
Two visions of unity and democracy
For Damascus, national unity primarily means institutional uniformity and sovereign authority from the capital. Autonomy can exist, but only within strict frameworks subordinate to the central state. For the Kurdish movement in Rojava, autonomy is instead about an alternative democratic architecture: legitimacy is built from the bottom up through local councils, communes and confederal structures. This ideological core of Rojava is strongly influenced by the thoughts of Abdullah Öcalan, which describes “democratic confederalism” as a model in which society organises itself from the bottom up, with an emphasis on direct participation, feminism and self-governance.
These contradictions between Damascus and Rojava are not just abstract ideological differences but touch concrete interests: who decides on oil revenues, who controls the borders, what security chains exist, and how is legislation made in a united Syria?
Identity, citizenship and the place of minorities
A second source of friction is identity politics and citizenship. Governance in Rojava is explicitly multiethnic and multilingual: Kurdish, Arabic and Syriac/Aramaic are official languages, and cultural rights are seen as core to the political project. Because these rights are vulnerable in a context where the central government does not automatically recognise them, Rojava also uses their protection as political tool in negotiations with Damascus.
But there is also a dark side: in some Arab regions, there is resentment against the SDF administration. Residents complain about discrimination, detention practices and poor management of local resources. Such local discontent makes it clear that the conflict is not only an ideological debate about what is just, but also a struggle about which governance can actually be credible and effective.
Security challenges: the legacy of IS
Pressure to create a single unified security structure is high, partly due to the legacy of the fight against the Islamic State. Detention camps and prisons in the northeast were for years a key argument for international support to the SDF and their special status. The recent chaos around prisons and outbreaks during fighting, in which hundreds of prisoners temporarily escaped and security forces temporarily lost control, shows how explosive this issue remains. At the same time, Damascus announced plans to build camps such as al-Hol and Roj to close, reinforcing the state narrative of “restoring order and normality”.
For Rojava, this is precisely where the ideological core of the conflict lies: their autonomous security structures are not just a means of defence, but a fundamental part of their political model. Full incorporation into a national security apparatus would, in practice, largely dismantle the confederal system of self-government. According to the International Crisis Group the 30 January agreement does offer a route to de-escalation, but the main problems remain: unclear command structures, local powers and deep-seated distrust do not disappear with a signature.
The role of Turkey, the US and Russia
The clash is exacerbated by the role of foreign players. Turkey, for instance, strongly opposes any Kurdish autonomy close to the border, seeing the Kurdish militant movement at home as a security threat. Ankara has repeatedly threatened with military action against the YPG, the SDF's main fighting force, and is putting pressure on Damascus to restrict Kurdish self-government structures.
The United States also remains a important factor through their cooperation with the SDF during the fight against IS. Washington uses these ties to support stability and security in the northeast, but their involvement is selective and dependent on broader strategic priorities in the region. Russia, on the other hand, is primarily looking to strengthen its position in rebuilt Syria. By engaging positioning as a mediator between Damascus and Rojava, and by agreeing on military bases and influence in the region, Moscow is trying to consolidate its strategic hold. At the same time, this mediation role gives Damascus extra weight in negotiations, putting pressure on Rojava to make concessions.
What does Syria's future look like?
What is at stake now in Rojava and more broadly in Syria is a choice between two images of a future state: a centralised nation-state with unified institutions, or a decentralised republic centred on local self-governance and pluralism. The agreement at the end of January may potentially reduce violence, but as long as the term “integration” for Damascus means in practice mainly absorption, and for Rojava mainly the end of their political project, the agreement remains superficial and new tensions are inevitable.
