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In an increasing number of Latin American countries, one political promise currently seems to sell best: security above all else. In practice, that also seems to mean security at all costs - including the rule of law, human rights, international cooperation and institutions.
Since his election in 2019 (and re-election in 2024), Nayib Bukele has been positioning himself as the president El Salvador has been waiting for, or in his own humble words, “an instrument of God”. On his Twitter account, the millennial described himself as “the world's coolest dictator’. His heavy-handed approach to crime, low regard for human rights and his anti-establishment stance do not seem to be hurting his popularity, both among his own people and among netizens. The Bukele model is also popular in neighbouring countries where more and more government leaders are looking to El Salvador for inspiration. A model of government where security is presented as a prerequisite for democracy and not something that should be in the hands of democratic institutions.
In countries like Ecuador, Honduras, Argentina and even Costa Rica - traditionally stable democracies - Bukele's approach seems to be gaining support. But who guards the rule of law when security is the highest political priority?
Safety over freedom?
In 2022, Bukele declared a state of emergency in El Salvador after at least 62 gang-related murders were committed in a single day. Drastic measures have since followed: the construction of the mega-prison CECOT, the abolition of the ban on re-election and a proposal to detain US citizens there. Basic rights of citizens such as the right to legal counsel and protection against arbitrary detention have been curtailed for a long time. El Salvador has struggled with widespread gang violence for decades and for years had the highest murder rates in the world. Bukele's main campaign point was to end the influence of gangs in the country. This war on gangs seems to justify far-reaching restrictions on rights. However, these measures affect not only criminals, but also ordinary citizens, including even Bukele supporters, can be deemed criminal without evidence or pardon. Curtailing the rights of criminals may be an early warning sign of democratic erosion.
In neighbouring Honduras, like El Salvador, a state of emergency was declared in 2022 in an attempt to tackle gang violence. This was then repeatedly extended and remains de facto in place to this day. Violent gangs also plague other countries such as Ecuador. There, President Daniel Noboa seems to be taking a cue from El Salvador. Noboa declared a state of emergency in 2024 and also a “war against the gangs”. In Panama, too, the continuous state of emergency is a logical response to gang violence. What follows is that emergency measures become structural policy, making democratic erosion and the violation of fundamental rights nothing more than the price a state has to pay for security.
Institutions as the enemy
A second feature of the Bukele model is the framing of (democratic or international) institutions as obstacles, and as one of the reasons why the situation in the country is or remains bad. Judges, journalists, NGOs and parliamentarians are not seen as actors who can and should resist in a democratic rule of law, but rather as sympathisers of a ‘corrupt elite’ or the violent gangs. Even the Supreme Court did not escape Bukele's authoritarianism and was bypassed in the run-up to Bukele's re-election. A re-election that was prohibited by law until 2024.
“They only care about criminals. It seems to me like there is something perverse behind NGOs and so-called ‘human rights organisations’ that are more like law firms for criminals.”
- Bukele during a state visit by Chilean President Antonio Kast
While the trend of delegitimising democratic actors is not limited to Latin America, it does seem to have particular resonance in the region. In Argentina, President Javier Milei profiles criticism or judicial review of his legislative proposals by the Supreme Court as an attack by “the elite undermining the will of the people”. A similar trend is also seen in Chile. During the 2019 protests against social inequality, then-president Sebastián Piñera significantly expanded the powers of police units, leading to injuries, deaths and mass arrests. President-elect José Antonio Kast in 2025 is an outspoken admirer of Pinochet, the Chilean dictator who held power from 1973 to 1990 after a CIA-backed coup. Under Pinochet, thousands of Chileans were murdered, tortured and disappeared. Moreover, Kast also seems to draw inspiration from the security rhetoric of Nayib Bukele; his campaign revolved around restoring security in Chile, blaming it mainly on immigrants. Such rhetoric increasingly portrays institutions as obstacles to the popular will, which prevents them from performing their functions properly and weakens the pillars under democracy.
Fake news as a policy strategy
A third element of the Bukele model is the use of fake news and social media. From editing campaign photos of the opponent to labelling independent journalism as fake news - it is characteristic of the Bukele strategy. From the moment Bukele became president in 2019, there has been an increase in accounts and hashtags used out of support for the president.
Incidentally, it is not an unheard-of phenomenon in the rest of Latin America. For instance, the hashtag “Chilezuela” went viral during the 2017 Chilean elections, warning that if Chile chose the centre-left candidate Alejandro Guillier, it would become a communist failed state. That Twitter is that favourite megaphone of politicians has long been known, but other social media are also used. In Brazil, supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro created fake websites and WhatsApp groups to spread disinformation and negatively frame political opponents ahead of the 2018 elections.
Bukele is by far the most popular of all the aforementioned politicians on social media. There, he presents a slick picture of how he is changing El Salvador to his liking. More than 11 million followers watch his cinematic edits, short videos of his speeches and videos of Bukele and his family, much of which is subtitled in English. That in return democratic regression is becoming the norm is of course not discussed - neither in the videos nor in the comments below them.
Playbook of the millennial dictator
Democracy rarely disappears overnight: it is a gradual erosion of the institutions that are supposed to protect values such as legal certainty, equality and participation. The rise of harsh security rhetoric and populist governance in Latin America therefore raises important questions about the future of democracy and the rule of law in the region.
Nayib Bukele's model of governing with a hard hand with limited space for press freedom and institutional counter-power is part of a broader trend. A global trend in which democratic institutions are increasingly dismissed as obstacles to popular will. As we have seen, he is not the only leader employing such strategies. But precisely because Bukele is so popular, the playbook of the millennial dictator extra attention.
