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Every year, when the olives ripen and Palestinian families prepare for the harvest, the West Bank should experience a period of economic growth, social cohesion and cautious optimism. The olive harvest is traditionally more than just an agricultural event: it symbolises continuity and the bond between community and land. Instead, the harvest has increasingly become an annual moment of fear, intimidation and violence. What was once a period of collective labour and intergenerational transfer is now a time when Palestinian farmers must reckon with attacks, destruction and the reality that they cannot safely enter their own country.
In recent years, this development has not been incidental, but structural. Recent reports from the United Nations show that the 2025 harvest season will be one of the most violent in at least 20 years, with 260 attacks in October, the highest number ever recorded in a single month. Palestinian farmers were attacked while harvesting, international and local volunteers were intimidated, and thousands of olive trees were uprooted or set on fire. In several villages, families only dare to enter their fields when accompanied by international observers, and sometimes not even then. What factors have caused this increase, and why is it now reaching a peak?
Legislation that helps settlers move forward
Over the past year, the Israeli government has taken a series of policy and legislative steps that further institutionalise the balance of power in the West Bank. A key development was the progress made on legislation which makes it easier for settlers to acquire land in the area. The proposed legislation contains two key provisions: firstly, the repeal of an existing Jordanian law protecting Palestinian land ownership, and secondly, the explicit statement that “every individual may acquire property rights in Judea and Samaria”, the Israeli name for the occupied West Bank..
Under the frame of eliminating alleged “discrimination” existing restrictions on land purchases are being relaxed, further eroding Palestinian land ownership rights. In a region where property rights have been unevenly applied and structurally contested for decades, such measures have consequences that extend far beyond their formal legal wording. The erosion of legal protection for Palestinian land lowers the threshold for the establishment of Israeli settlements and state projects. For Palestinians, this means a structural loss of control over their land, with direct consequences: agricultural land disappears, construction and investment become impossible, and entire families are losing their livelihoods. As Mousa Shabaneh, 52, from Sinjil puts it: “In the end, they took away our income. Sinjil is now a large prison.” referring to the fences that have been erected to protect the settlements.
The highest number of new settlements since the Oslo Accords
On top of that came the decision earlier this year 22 new settlements to be approved, the highest number since the signing of the Oslo Accords. Earlier this month, there were another 19 settlements legalised. Both consisted of several outposts, a small, informally constructed Israeli settlement in the West Bank, usually consisting of a few caravans or barracks. These outposts are established by Israeli settlers without official government authorisation and are therefore illegal according to International and Israeli law.The settlements remain illegal under international law, even after recognition of the State of Israel.
Legalising these outposts gives them access to infrastructure, security protection and administrative support. This changes not only their legal status, but also the actual situation on the ground. For surrounding Palestinian villages, this means a further restriction of freedom of movement., Roads are closed, access to agricultural land is blocked, and checkpoints or permit systems make it difficult to reach their own land. This leads to increased daily friction and a greater likelihood of confrontation, particularly during periods of intensive land use, such as the olive harvest.
Normalisation of violence
Since October 2023, the political and social context in which this violence takes place has changed dramatically. The genocide in Gaza has not only led to large-scale violence there, but also to a broader hardening of the security discourse. within Israel and the occupied territories. Palestinians are increasingly being collectively viewed as a potential threat, a framing that has a profound impact on policy, public language and enforcement. In the West Bank, this shift translates into a combination of more intensive military operations and a social and political atmosphere in which violence against Palestinians seems less exceptional and is less consistently discouraged.
This normalisation became even more apparent in 2025 when it was announced that the Israeli police had arrested a rabbi from the extreme right-wing settlement movement. investigated for inciting attacks on Palestinians, in connection with violence against the Palestinian village of Bruqin. This did not involve covert communication, but rather public statements that were directly linked to specific incidents of violence. From the research It turned out that he was inciting and supporting violence against Palestinians via social media. The fact that such an investigation was deemed necessary emphasises how far the boundaries of what is socially and politically acceptable have shifted. At the same time, confidence in the effectiveness of enforcement is steadily declining, precisely because extremist rhetoric is increasingly encouraged by political forces and Israeli society.
The harvest as a turning point
The olive harvest serves as a moment of reckoning when these structures become visible. It is precisely during this period that dependence on land, the vulnerability of Palestinian farmers and the asymmetry in protection and rights converge. The fact that these confrontations recur year after year points to a systemic problem that cannot be solved by temporary security measures or incidental convictions.
At the end of 2025, an unavoidable question arises: what does continuing on this course mean for the coming years? The signs do not point to stabilisation or de-escalation. On the contrary, the institutional anchoring of settlements, the further legalisation of exclusion and the normalisation of extremist language point to a trajectory in which escalation is becoming increasingly likely and violence is increasingly seen as the norm rather than the exception.
This year will therefore not be remembered as an anomaly, but as a moment when existing trends deepened and hardened. The harvest of 2025 confirmed what is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: that the space for Palestinian life, work and security in the West Bank is being systematically restricted. Not by a single event, but by an accumulation of policy choices, legislation and social changes that together form a harsh and inevitable reality.
