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This article was posted as part of our work in the Dutch Democracy Coalition. This project was created with support from Democracy & Media Foundation.
This article is based on interviews with Pieter van Boheemen (Post-X Society) and Alice Stollmeyer (Defend Democracy) on the impact of new EU regulations on political advertisements and the resilience of democracy.
From October 2025, new rules on political ads will apply in the European Union. Parties and platforms must then be more transparent about who pays for an ad, who the target audience is and based on what data people see it. The regulation (2024/900) aims to make elections fairer and protect citizens from digital influence.
But even before the law is in force, the first effects are making themselves felt. Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, announced in Europe temporarily stop with political and social ads. The reason given by Meta: it would be easier to ban political advertising altogether than to comply with the new, complex rules.
A well-intentioned law with unforeseen effects
The European regulation mandatory political ads to recognisable labels with information on sender, funding and targeting. It also limits the scope for microtargeting, the use of personal data to target voters in a tailored way.
In theory, the new rules should ensure more openness. In practice, the implementation However, to the tech companies themselves, who have to determine what exactly constitutes a "political advertisement" and how it complies with the law. This raises questions, as these companies are not only the implementers, but also the players who benefit most from the current, opaque advertising market.
This raises a more fundamental issue: who actually determines what is political? If platforms draw the line themselves, this could include social issues such as climate or migration. Van Boheemen does not necessarily think it is problematic for platforms to bear that responsibility, as long as those choices are made transparently and equally; otherwise, EU over-regulation may result. Stollmeyer, on the other hand, warns that this will make public debate more dependent on the technical and commercial interests of a handful of companies.
Meta's decision to block political ads altogether shows that tension well. According to Stollmeyer, this is a form of "malign compliance": formally complying with the rules but undermining their purpose. Instead of becoming more transparent, political communication simply disappears from view. Van Boheemen calls it a logical business decision; avoiding high fines is easier than investing in compliance.
That choice seems safe, but it has consequences. Especially smaller and new parties are losing an important channel for reaching voters, while larger parties remain visible through traditional media. The balance of power is shifting, and Meta's algorithms now determine what users get to see even more than before. The law that is supposed to bring more fairness thus paradoxically creates a quieter and less insightful debate.
At the same time, with other legislation, such as the Digital Markets Act, actually reducing that dependency. New commitments around data portability and interoperability should ensure that users can take their data with them and that different platforms can better communicate with each other. In theory, this could break the power of big tech companies, but in practice it is still of limited visibility.
Does this make democracy stronger?
The new rules increase transparency but do not address the core issue of digital influence. Until it is clear how algorithms determine who gets to see what information, the impact of technology on public debate remains largely invisible.
Microtargeting is just one aspect of a much larger system that structurally guides behaviour, attention and emotions. Even if personalised ads disappear, recommendation algorithms continue to set the tone. Political influence then shifts from paid ads to seemingly spontaneous content, influencers or "news" accounts not covered by the rules.
Moreover, influence does not stop at elections. It takes place all year round, through the way social media prioritises certain topics or votes. This makes it important to look not only at advertising, but at the infrastructure of digital public discourse itself.
The power of the tech industry
Both Stollmeyer and Van Boheemen see that the tech industry still sets the tone in the conversation about regulation. Big companies have enormous lobbying power and often manage to influence regulation in such a way that it hardly affects their position.
At the same time, they shift responsibility to users. Insisting on media literacy and fact-checking creates the impression that digital deception is mainly a matter of individual behaviour. In reality, the problem lies deeper: in the way platforms are designed and generate profits from attention and outrage.
The Netherlands is no exception. The current code of conduct for online political ads is voluntary and has no sanctions. Only with the new European regulation do real obligations arise, but implementation remains tricky as long as companies decide for themselves how to interpret the rules.
Regulate earlier, not later
Stollmeyer and Van Boheemen stress that we start regulating too late in the process. Most laws try to limit damage after technology has already gained influence, whereas regulation should actually take place at the front end.
Stollmeyer therefore argues for rules similar to those for cars, medicines or food: technology that has major societal impact must demonstrate in advance that it is safe. Algorithms that influence information or election campaigns should be tested as rigorously as products that affect public health.
True resilience requires more than legislation. It also means investing in education, independent research and a proprietary digital infrastructure that puts public values above commercial interests.
Democracy in maintenance
The new EU rules are a step forward, but do not solve the underlying problem. They make visible who pays for political ads, but do not touch the technology that determines who gets to see what.
Whether it makes our democracy more resilient depends on the next step: does Europe dare to regulate not only ads, but technology itself?
Until algorithms and AI systems have the same security and transparency requirements as other risky products, the our digital information landscape will remain an experiment running on commercial logic.
So protecting elections and our democracy does not start with banning advertisements, but with designing a digital ecosystem that places fairness, openness and public accountability at its core.
