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The humanitarian crisis in Sudan has received extra attention in the news and on social media in recent weeks, but the conflict has now been going on for more than two years. While serious crimes are being committed, international attention is minimal. What role do the Netherlands and the EU play in the humanitarian crisis in Sudan and why is the issue under-reported?
To better understand this situation, we spoke to Osama Idries, a trade unionist at the FNV, originally from Sudan and active as a trainer in the country until 2015 (with years of experience in civil society).
Not a civil war, but a battle between armies
Although this humanitarian crisis is often referred to as a civil war, is in reality about a battle between two military power blocs: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the official government army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary organisation emerged from the Arab Janjaweed-militias that early this century established a committed genocide in Darfur.
Before the war, former president Al Bashir was in power and during his rule, the current instability had already begun. Due to this instability and discontent in the country, protests against Al Bashir began in December 2018. This discontent grew especially among the youth. The demonstrations were dealt with harshly, but the youth continued according to Idries: “I did keep in touch with the country after I left Sudan, and then I decided to go back annually to organise training sessions for young people who wanted to start a revolution.” This also eventually worked out. “The youth managed to start a revolution, deposing the dictatorial president.” After the fall of dictator Omar Al Bashir, SAF and RSF became temporary allies. A transitional government was formed with the aim of stabilising a country and eventually installing a democratically elected government. This process was difficult. In October 2021, army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan staged a coup. El Burhan justified this coup by claiming he was causing unrest this transitional period and he came to restore stability, but the situation only worsened. The economy collapsed further and international aid organisations withdrew. Eventually, the Sudanese's prediction came true: a war between SAF and RSF was indeed coming.
The split between army and militia
During this coup, Al-Burhan indeed collaborated with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, then secretary-general of the army and leader of the RSF. However, when another government had to be formed later, tensions between the two ran high. The power struggle was mainly over future influence of the RSF army and the lucrative gold sector. Gold became Sudan's main source of income after South Sudan seceded in 2011 and took possession of most oil reserves. Since South Sudan's secession in 2011, gold has been the country's main source of income.
The rift between the two leaders, as many Sudanese already knew, led to war. On 15 April 2023, the RSF captured Khartoum airport, an attack widely seen as the start of the current humanitarian crisis and the beginning of the battle for Khartoum, Sudan's capital.
Result: mass murder and ethnic cleansing
Since 2023, more than 150,000 Sudanese perished and his over 12 million people displaced. NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and several UN bodies report serious human rights violations, including mass killings, rapes and attacks on civilians. Human Rights Watch even speaks of genocide, an accusation made only when specific criteria are met under Article 2 of the UN Genocide Convention. According to the Human Rights Watch report, the RSF is carrying out systematic attacks aimed at ethnically cleansing non-Arab populations in El Genetica, among others. Earlier this year, an estimated 15,000 people there, mostly Massalit, murdered. Massalit is an African ethnic group in Sudan.
Several large-scale death tolls have already occurred during attacks by both armies, but the one that has stood out the most in recent months was the RSF army's attack on El Fasher in October. El Fasher was one of the last towns in the Darfur region under government army control. After 18 months the RSF still managed to invade the town and drive SAF out of the city. The recent attack on El Fasher in October, in which more than 2,000 civilians were killed, meant almost complete RSF control over the Darfur region. The reason the capture of this town received much media attention was because of satellite images showing the destruction of the city and mass killings.
Foreign interference and economic interests
Despite warnings from genocide experts and calls from the UN, a clear international response remains largely absent. A major reason for the limited attention from the Netherlands and Europe is geopolitical and economic interests with countries playing a role in the war. According to multiple investigations weapons from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), although the Emirates deny it. The reason is the gold trade: the RSF controls gold mines in Darfur and Kordofan and smuggles the gold via Chad and Libya to Dubai, where it enters the international market. In turn, the SAF receives funding from Egypt which wants to limit chaos on its southern border and control refugee flows. In addition, Egypt has plenty of economic relations, Idries says: "Also, if you look at exports of products from Egypt, there are many truly Sudanese that are not even produced in Egypt. The stakes in the war are high”. Iran is also reportedly supplying arms to the SAF to gain influence over the Red Sea through Sudan and support the Houthis in Yemen. At the same time, countries such as Russia and Turkey earn from arms supplies to both sides.
Netherlands, trade and moral responsibility
From an economic perspective, there is a complex intertwining of interests of different actors on the international scene. Idries points out that the interests are so strong that international actors mainly benefit from the continuity of the war. These, largely economic interests, may further explain the intervention and condemnation of the Sudan humanitarian crisis. The Netherlands will import more than $ 1.95 billion of goods from the UAE and exported there $ 4.56 billion of goods to it. This makes the Netherlands the op third largest importer and exporter of Emirates in the EU, after Germany. The gold that the Emirates imports, largely illegally, from Sudan is resold on the Emirati gold market. The UN also has evidence of the Emirates supplying the RSF army with ammunition, including high-tech drones, and hosting the RSF's financial infrastructure. Emirates denied this.
Apart from the Emirates, there are other countries that have economic interests in continuing the war in Sudan. Russia, for example, supports the RSF to some extent with ammunition in exchange for mining and oil deals. Sudanese blood gold is also affecting the progress of the Russia-Ukraine war. Thus, Russia imports, often illegally, tonnes of gold to further sell on its gold market. One of the biggest buyers of ‘Russian gold’ is the Emirates, with a trade amount of over $ 5.4 trillion by 2024 alone. CNN confirms that the Russian war machine can keep running in this way. This describes Idries: “Much of Sudanese gold goes from the Emirates to Russia, allowing Russia to evade Western measures and thus finance the war with Ukraine”. He further explained that if the West restricted trade with the Emirates, it would create space for Russia to increase trade with the Emirates. When asked if an NL censure of the war would have much effect on the Emirates, Idries said the following: “Most importantly, this would be a step to put pressure on. This is then mainly moral pressure on other countries trading with the Emirates to also take a clear stance.”
Economic dependence and political restraint
To avoid damaging diplomatic - and especially economic - relations, the Netherlands is opting for an apathetic stance. What started as a civil war grew into a political chess game where Sudan, due to its geopolitical location, acts as a chessboard and international actors play a role in perpetuating this humanitarian crisis. The question of why this crisis in Sudan has been under-reported in the Netherlands is reflected in the weighing of interests by the Dutch government. Here, economic interests outweigh innocent Sudanese lives. The Netherlands indirectly contributes to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan by continuing its trade with the United Arab Emirates, which can be identified as one of the major culprits. Sanctions against the Emirates or a harsh condemnation of the Dutch government unfortunately fail to materialise.
This article was written in collaboration with David Nduwayo of International Foundation GroenLinks (IFG).
