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MIGRATION: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES



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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIP	European External Investment Plan
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FEPS	Foundation for European Progressive Studies
FMS	Foundation Max van der Stoel
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
RIDEO	Returns Diaspora Integrated Development Organisation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the large increase of, mainly, Syrian refugees into Europe in the summer of 2015, migration has been one of the key topics in European Union (EU) politics. Irregular migrants from African countries often take the same routes to travel into the EU. Consequently, irregular migration became intertwined with the issue of refugees. This resulted in a political crisis. As a response, the EU started to focus on tackling the root causes of irregular migration. This study focuses on these responses. Are they effective and sufficient, and if not, what can be done to improve EU migration policies?

African perspectives have been lacking in this debate, but are crucial in our opinion. Stakeholders in the countries in question know what is happening on the ground and what is necessary to implement effective policies or improve failing ones. In this study we have attempted to include these kinds of stakeholders. To this end, we visited two African countries, Ghana and Tunisia. In addition, we spoke to many experts in the EU and put special emphasis on the experience of diaspora organisations and their leaders.

Irregular migration of Africans into the EU is a humanitarian disaster because the routes people take are often dangerous. Many migrants have died whilst crossing the Mediterranean Sea or in the Sahara desert. In Libya, there are many examples of migrants detained in horrible detention camps. Moreover, living and working in Europe without papers often results in extreme poverty and increases risks of exploitation. Furthermore, it is a political problem for the EU. There is a lack of willingness to accept migrants and the burden is not equally shared by all EU countries.

When targeting the root causes of migration, it is crucial to know what these root causes are. Stakeholders in Ghana and Tunisia identified unemployment, high levels of corruption, no future prospects, and large inequalities in the world as key root causes for migration. EU policies do, to a certain extent, target these kinds of issues. But are they sufficient? This study shows that an effective EU strategy is lacking. Many resources serve different objectives, including the European wish to improve border management and control in African countries themselves, which has no effect whatsoever on alleviating the root causes of migration. We will argue that the resources that do go towards tackling root causes, such as unemployment and corruption, often lack sufficient scale to really make a difference. A long-term perspective is needed for two reasons. Firstly, even when targeting the relevant root causes in a sufficient manner, research shows that in the short term migration will continue to increase due to, amongst other things, higher income of potential migrants. Secondly, an equal partnership between Africa and Europe is needed to take steps to prevent and combat the large inequalities in the world. Here, a return to spending 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) is crucial.

The current EU approach is also lacking vision in another way. With the ageing population in Europe, there exists a real need for labour migrants in different sectors of our economy. This, however, needs to be well regulated in order to be effective and to avoid a potentially harmful brain drain in the countries concerned. Circular migration could be an important

instrument in this regard, but it should be beneficial for all parties involved. This requires thorough analysis of the needs and investment in educational systems in the countries of origin, as well as investment in employment opportunities. Circular migration will only succeed if migrants have something to return to, where they can use the acquired skills. More broadly, it should become easier for Africans to get access to visas for EU countries. Many Africans have a distorted and unrealistic view of European countries, also impacted by the difficulties of entering Europe legally. Increasing the possibilities and channels for travel between the two continents, will thus also contribute towards a fairer representation of what Europe really looks like.

The diaspora is a crucial bridge for including African perspectives into European policies. Their perspectives are crucial, because with their voices included, we will be able to better understand what is needed in those countries. This study contributes to the policy discussion with several recommendations that do include these African perspectives. Only with fair policies can Europe be an equal partner to Africa.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Migration and integration have been key political issues in the European Union (EU) in recent years, but the phenomenon has a long history. Migrant workers were essential in the period of rebuilding after the Second World War. Some fifty years ago, companies were badly in need of labour and started recruiting young men from Turkey, Northern Africa, but also from European countries such as Spain and Portugal. The process of decolonisation also led to a large increase of migrants coming to the former colonising countries. At that time, the assumption was that they only came here temporarily as 'guest workers', but this has been proved wrong.

When the economy slowed down in the 1970s and many European countries entered into an economic recession, the migrant workers were often the first to get fired. Nevertheless, many of them decided to stay and bring their families to their new home countries. In the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, we also saw an influx of refugees from war-torn countries or totalitarian regimes, like Yugoslavia, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Economic migrants and refugees changed the composition of societies and, in some instances, this created resistance within these very countries.

Often, the newcomers were offered housing in the poorest parts of cities. Much of the original population left these areas as soon as they could afford something better. The people that remained often felt frustrated and blamed the migrants for their own situation. In various countries, these frustrations were not only felt in regard to housing, but also with respect to other issues such as labour and employment, educational opportunities, etc. Integration of newcomers has become a prominent issue in many countries since the new millennium.

These issues contributed to the recent rise of populist and far-right political parties. Although some of these parties have their historical background in the national socialist movement, many of them were new and generally established to protest against the diversification of their societies. Here, 2015 can be seen as a breaking point. The huge numbers of refugees from Syria were a real game-changer. Angela Merkel's 'wir schaffen das' proved to be too simplistic. There was a lack of political will in Europe to really deliver and to implement sufficient capabilities to receive a large group of arrivals.

In countries like Sweden, Germany and Austria stricter policies were implemented. Italy and Greece saw hundreds of thousands of people arriving by boat. As a result, many migrants lost their lives at sea or were subjected to appalling living conditions in refugee camps. Attempts to alleviate the pressure by means of a common EU approach were unsuccessful. Solidarity between the 28 EU countries proved to be an illusion. The European Commission devised a scheme for the resettlement and reallocation of migrants across different member states, but many of the member countries refused to implement

this scheme. The Schengen agreement, which abolished internal border checks, was even temporarily suspended in seven EU countries.

The issue of economic migrants from African countries entering Italy by boat, or climbing the fences of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, became intertwined with the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’, as some applied for refugee status to enter Europe. Solutions need to be found to regulate such economic migration. This was also to prevent economic migrants from working illegally under slave-like conditions, as is the reality in many EU countries. In recent years, EU development aid and that of individual member states have increasingly been deployed to counter economic migration. Aid has been made conditional on the agreement to stricter migration policies.

There has been much criticism of these policies, including criticism that the policies do not work to prevent irregular migration from Africa. It is clear, however, that the voices of Africans in the diaspora and at home are largely ignored. These voices are needed and should be taken into account in order to generate effective policies. This study is an attempt to do exactly this.

CHAPTER 2

SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHODS

To further include African perspectives in the migration debate and policies we need to ask African stakeholders questions such as: What is the reality in your country? What do you need? What has worked in the past and what did not? Including perspectives from those who are impacted by the policy will strengthen it, because it is only then that understanding is generated around what is really needed and what the current situation on the ground is. In the European policy discourse surrounding migration these African perspectives have been lacking.

This study is based on two field case studies in Ghana (November 2018) and Tunisia (February 2019) where we asked stakeholders question similar to those mentioned above. Both countries are lower-middle-income countries with significant emigration, also towards Europe. Together they can give some insights into the differences and similarities between North African and Western African experiences. Due to time and capacity limits, it was not possible to visit more countries. During the research phase, however, affiliated researchers also visited Burkina Faso, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss migration issues with important local stakeholders to broaden the scope.

Migration: what are we talking about?

Firstly, it is important to address what we are actually talking about, and more importantly, who we are talking about. Who are migrants? Are they different from refugees? These are some important questions that need clarification. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) uses the following definition for migration:

‘Migration is the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.’¹

This extended definition shows that migration is complex and multifaceted. That is why it is important to use the right terms and concepts when discussing it.

This research focuses specifically on economic migrants from African countries. These are persons migrating for economic reasons, looking for work or better living conditions in other countries. This is a distinct category from persons identified as refugees. The status of refugees is well governed in international law, specifically in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in 1951. This convention defines who can be

¹ IOM website: *Key Migration Terms*, <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-term>. A more extensive overview of key migration terms can also be found on this website.

regarded as a refugee, and also outlines the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of those nations which grant them asylum². Other types of migration, including many forms of economic migration, are not as well regulated.

Another complicating factor when discussing distinct types of migrants is that every migrant has a different background. Some move because they fear conflict or prosecution in their home country, some look for better lives and jobs. Others simply migrate because of family reunification or with study visas. The latter two groups are largely excluded in this research, because they generally migrate through regular channels. Some migrants want to permanently leave their country, others only want to migrate temporarily. These differing motivations are one reason why we often talk about ‘mixed migration’; the reasons for migration are often mixed and can also change along the way. A second reason to talk about mixed migration is that different categories of migrants often use the same routes. For example, in 2015, refugees from Syria took the same route into Europe as some economic migrants from African countries.

Besides distinguishing between types of migrants, there is also a difference regarding their status. Migrants can be regular or irregular. Migrants can be irregular in many ways: it can be due to the way they enter the country of transit or of destination without the correct legal papers; migrants can become irregular when they overstay their visa, or when they are working without the correct papers. Regular migrants, on the other hand, migrate and stay compliant with the laws of the countries of origin, transit and destination.

In this study, we thus focus on irregular economic migrants from African countries, migrating – or aspiring to migrate – into the EU. We focus on African migrants who do not qualify as refugee, and who, at the same time, fall outside the scope of any legal means to stay in or enter Europe. Therefore, if they decide to migrate into the EU, their only option is to do it in an irregular way.

Country choice and method

Ghana is a lower-middle-income country in West Africa. Although the number of irregular Ghanaian migrants arriving in Europe is relatively small, these numbers are still relevant. Ghana recently (2019) became a partner country of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)³, one of the key European migration policy frameworks, and since 2016 has a national strategy on migration, including immigration into Ghana, emigration and the role of diaspora. This showcases the role of Ghana not only as a country of origin, but also as transit country and destination country for migrants. Other research shows that Ghanaians, like the majority of West Africans, stay within the African continent when migrating, contradictory to popular belief in Europe⁴.

GHANA

Ghana, with Accra as capital, is located in West Africa. It is a lower-middle-income country, and perceived to be one of the more developed countries of the continent, although large inequalities still persist. The social system is underfunded and it experiences challenges by an ever-growing, especially urban, population. Politically, Ghana is a unitary republic with an executive presidency and a multiparty system in which the liberal conservative New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the social democratic National Democratic Congress (NDC) are dominant. The current president is Nana Akufo-Addo of the NPP, who won the presidential election in December 2016.

Ghana has a well-defined national migration policy that addresses legal and regulatory aspects of migration. It is predominantly an emigration country, but also functions as a destination country for migrants. Most Ghanaians migrate to other African countries, of which Nigeria is the most popular destination. Since 2013, there has been a significant increase in the number of irregular crossings of Ghanaians to Europe. The Ghanaian government has expressed concerns about the brain drain that comes with emigration given how most Ghanaians who migrate are relatively highly educated. Return migration of Ghanaian professionals is, on the other hand, an important economic driver as former migrants often become self-employed and invest in private enterprises.

- Date of independence: 6 March 1957
- Population (2018): 29.8 million
- Population growth (2018): 2.2%
- Life expectancy at birth (2017): 63.5
- GDP per capita (2018, current US\$): \$2,202
- GDP (2018, current US\$): \$65.6 billion
- Personal remittances received (2018, % GDP): 5.8%
- Unemployment (2018, modelled ILO estimate): 6.7%
- Youth unemployment (2018, modelled ILO estimate): 13.7%

The World Bank, *Ghana*, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana>.

Tunisia is a completely different country. Situated in North Africa, the distance to Europe is relatively short. Although the country is seen as the exception in terms of how the country is believed to have experienced positive change following the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, the economic situation of many Tunisians is still very precarious. Tunisia is considered as an important country of origin, especially in Italy where Tunisians are the largest group of migrants arriving irregularly⁵. Due to its geographical location, it is less a country of transit and destination for other migrants from the African continent. A majority of African migrants, in fact, prefer to go through Libya and Algeria, neighbouring countries of Tunisia, to reach Europe.

² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees*, <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>.

³ One of the key EU policies on migration within the EU context. For more information on the EUTF, see chapter 3.

⁴ See for example Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Hein de Haas, ‘African migration: trends, patterns, drivers’, in *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2016).

⁵ For actual numbers, see UNHCR, Operational Portal refugee situations, *Italy*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205>.

TUNISIA

Tunisia, with its capital Tunis, is located in the northern part of Africa. It has a relatively favourable demographic situation, with low population growth, high life expectancy and higher living standards. Tunisia is however still a lower-middle-income country. During the Arab Spring (2010-2011), citizens of Tunisia succeeded in overthrowing President Ben Ali. Since then, the country has been transforming into an emerging democracy. President Essebi (2014-2019) has not really succeeded in addressing the growing discontent of the Tunisian people. After Essebi's death in July 2019, Tunisians elected Kais Saied as President of the Republic.

Tunisia is primarily an emigration country, and the majority of Tunisians migrate towards Europe. Since the early 1960s, bilateral labour agreements were signed between Tunisia and several European countries. Irregular migration increased since the 1970s, when it became harder for Tunisians to work in Europe. Tunisians are now the largest group of irregular arrivals in Italy. Since the Arab Spring, there have been attempts to formulate a comprehensive national migration strategy, but the draft was never formally adopted. However, since the uprising, representatives of Tunisians living abroad are represented in Parliament.

- Date of independence: 20 March 1956
- Population (2018): 11.6 million
- Population growth (2018): 1.1%
- Life expectancy at birth (2017): 76.31
- GDP per capita (2018, current US\$): \$3,447
- GDP (2018, current US\$): \$39.9 billion
- Personal remittances received (2018, % GDP): 4.8%
- Unemployment (2018, modelled ILO estimate): 15.5%
- Youth unemployment (2018, modelled ILO estimate): 34.8%

The World Bank, *Tunisia*, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/tunisia>.

Both countries combined provide a broad image of migration issues taking place in West and North African countries, two regions where most of the irregular African migrants towards Europe come from. Therefore, these two countries are relevant for the study, keeping in mind that different countries in the region would allow for different perspectives.

This study draws on the results of 39 semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders in combination with desk-based research and a literature review. Stakeholders include academics in Europe and Africa, representatives from civil society and non-governmental organisations, civil servants within (local) governments within African and European countries, as well as representatives from EU institutions. Through several other meetings, interviews were also conducted with experts from other African countries, including from Senegal, Burkina Faso and Morocco.

Initial findings of the study were also discussed in the course of two expert meetings conducted in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. This group of people consisted of experts with a range of different backgrounds, including civil servants, members of African diaspora groups, academics, representatives from international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and others. The researcher also participated in the meetings of the Global Migration Group of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies. This is a group of around 25 experts who discuss and formulate concrete policy proposals for a progressive migration policy.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Since the Lisbon Treaty of the EU, which entered into force in 2009, policy coherence for development (PCD) is a legal obligation for the EU and its member states⁶. Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty mentions that: ‘The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries’. The goal of PCD is that policies of, in this case, the EU do not undermine development cooperation objectives. The legal obligation of PCD is that the EU now has to take these development objectives into account, although it still has the possibility to put these objectives aside.

Migration is one of the priority areas where the EU agreed to actively promote PCD. This links to what is called the ‘migration-development nexus’, which is defined as ‘the totality of mechanisms through which migration and development dynamics affect each other’⁷. It recognises the importance of migration as a vehicle for development, as well as the role development plays with regard to migration. Within this nexus migration and development are thus not seen as two separate policy fields, but as issues that complement and affect the other. Attention to the migration-development nexus became more prominent in the early 2000s.

Important to mention with regard to the ‘migration-development nexus’ is also the promise by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on development assistance. This target was already accepted in the late 1960s. However, currently only eight DAC member countries meet or exceed the 0.7% target⁸.

European policies on migration and development

Many migration-related policy steps have been taken at the European level since the early 2000s. A first major document was the 2005 Global Approach to Migration, which was revised in 2011 to encompass a broader concept, resulting in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). GAMM also included the concept of mobility partnerships⁹, which address different migration and mobility issues and can be used for new ways to improve regular movements between the EU and a third country.

⁶ European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, article 208, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12007L%2FTXT>

⁷ Jørgen Carling, ‘Thirty-six migration nexuses, and counting’, posted in <https://jorgencarling.org/2017/07/31/thirty-six-migration-nexuses-and-counting/>. Concept originally introduced by N.N. Sørensen, N. van Hear, and P.E. Pedersen, ‘The migration-development nexus: Evidence and policy options’, in *International Migration*, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2012), pp. 49-73.

⁸ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Development aid drops in 2018, especially to neediest countries*, <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/development-aid-drops-in-2018-especially-to-neediest-countries.htm>.

⁹ See also FMS research for more information on the mobility partnership of the EU with Cape Verde and its development impact. Linde-Kee van Stokkum, *More mobility for development! Policy coherence for development in practice: making the EU Mobility Partnership a tool for development in Cape Verde*, Amsterdam, Foundation Max van der Stoep, 2015, https://www.foundationmaxvanderstoep.nl/uploads/tekstblok/fms_more_mobility_for_development.pdf.

Since 2015, EU policies on migration have followed rapidly. In May of that year, the European Commission presented the European Agenda on Migration¹⁰, focusing on four pillars to enhance migration management. These pillars include legal migration, a common asylum policy, border management and reducing the incentives for irregular migration. It uses the term ‘addressing the root causes’ of irregular migration, making it one of the first times the concept entered official EU discourse.

Addressing the root causes of irregular migration assumes that irregular migration has several root causes, and that by taking away these root causes, irregular migration can be prevented. It assumes that greater investment in development assistance will provide incentives for people to stay at home instead of migrating¹¹. Therefore, since then, and especially since the Valletta Summit in November 2015, ‘addressing the root causes’ of migration has become one of the central messages of EU migration and development policies.

At the Valletta Summit, European and African Heads of State and Government met to discuss the ongoing large number of arrivals of refugees and irregular African migrants in the EU. The goal of the summit was to strengthen cooperation between the two continents, and to address the current challenges and opportunities of migration. The Valletta Summit resulted in the Valletta Action Plan, which includes the EUTF as its financial instrument. EUTF projects address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration, and contribute to better migration management. These four points are the key goals of the Valletta Action Plan and the EUTF.

Important EU policies and documents implemented later include the EU-Turkey Statement¹² that took effect in March 2016 and the Partnership Framework on Migration with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration¹³, just a few months later. This partnership framework allows for migration ‘compacts’ with third countries. These compacts are described as a ‘fluid process’. There is no specific format, but the compacts are tailored to the specific partner country and combine different policy elements like development assistance, trade, mobility and security¹⁴.

In 2017, the new European Consensus on Development¹⁵ was published. Migration is one of the prominent topics in this document, outlining, for example, that ‘addressing migration

cuts across many policy areas’¹⁶. It also, once again, emphasises the importance of addressing the root causes of migration, and it acknowledges the need for conditionality: ‘(...) applying the necessary leverage by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools, including development and trade’¹⁷.

All these policies show how, since 2015, the idea of ‘addressing the root causes’ of migration has entered the migration and development debate. Subsequently, the use of traditional development assistance funds has broadened to include more topics and countries than before to be able to address the root causes of irregular migration as much as possible. In 2017, the Commission introduced the European External Investment Plan (EIP)¹⁸, which focuses on promoting investments in Africa and neighbourhood countries, including supporting private investment. The EIP and EUTF are new forms of financing initiatives to curb irregular migration by promoting development.

International actions on migration and development

Meanwhile, a great deal has happened on the global scene as well. In 2015, UN member countries adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These SDGs, also known as the Global Goals, are built on the Millennium Development Goals, but aspire to go further and have a broader scope. The SDGs not only aim to end all forms of poverty, but also call for action to promote sustainable growth and social justice while protecting the planet. The topic of migration is included in SDG 10, which calls for reducing inequality in and among countries. Target 10.7 reads ‘Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’¹⁹. The 2030 Agenda recognises, for the first time, the contribution of migration to sustainable development²⁰.

One year after the adoption of the SDGs, another important meeting took place at the UN level. In 2016, the UN General Assembly hosted a high-level plenary meeting devoted entirely to international migration. The result of the meeting was the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants²¹. In this declaration countries agreed to negotiate a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), as well as a separate Global Compact on Refugees. The New York Declaration specifically refers to the 2030 Agenda and the positive contribution of migration to development:

10 European Commission, *A European Agenda on Migration*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.

11 European Parliament, *Interlinks between migration and development*, Briefing, PE 630.351, Brussels, 2019, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/630351/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)630351_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/630351/EPRS_BRI(2019)630351_EN.pdf).

12 European Council, *EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016*, Press release, 2016, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>.

13 European Commission, *On establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank, COM(2016) 385 final, Strasbourg, 2016, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2016/0385/COM_COM\(2016\)0385_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2016/0385/COM_COM(2016)0385_EN.pdf).

14 European Commission, *Migration Partnership Framework. A new approach to better manage migration*, fact sheet, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf.

15 Council, *The new European Consensus on Development, ‘Our world, our dignity, our future’*, joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the Member States Meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, <https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/>.

16 Council, *The new European Consensus on Development*, article 40.

17 Council, *The new European Consensus on Development*, article 40.

18 European Commission, *Strengthening European Investments for jobs and growth: Towards a second phase of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and a new European External Investment Plan*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Central Bank, The European Economic and Social Committee, The Committee of the Regions and The European Investment Bank, COM(2016) 581 final, Brussels, 2016, <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-581-F1-EN-MAIN.PDF>.

19 United Nations, *Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries*, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/>.

20 Migration Data Portal, *Migration data for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)*, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/>.

21 United Nations, *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrations*, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016, A/RES/71/1, New York, 2016, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_71_1.pdf.

*'In adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development one year ago, we recognised clearly the positive contribution made by migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development. Our world is a better place for that contribution. The benefits and opportunities of safe, orderly and regular migration are substantial and are often underestimated. Forced displacement and irregular migration in large movements, on the other hand, often present complex challenges.'*²²

The process for drafting the GCM started with a consultation phase in 2017. Early 2018 a 'zero draft' was published, after which consultations and intergovernmental negotiations were held. In the UN General Assembly of September 2018, the GCM was presented, and it was officially adopted in December of that year in Marrakech, Morocco. However, ultimately some European member states²³ decided not to sign the GCM, after much public outcry.

The relationship between migration and development

The 'migration-development nexus', which plays a role in Europa as well as in the international context, implies that there is a relation between migration and development. This often focuses on the idea that migration has potentially significant positive effects on the country of origin, mainly through remittances. On the other hand, as is shown in EU policies, it also implies that there is a reverse link between development and migration. The European Commission is inclined to think that increased development in the countries of origin will decrease migration. In this view, creating employment and educational opportunities, strengthening the rule of law, building better governance and so on will not only increase development in the countries of origin, but also take away key push factors for migration, such as poverty, unemployment and corruption.

Consequently, funds for development assistance are used as part of migration policies. This is a main point of criticism of the EUTF by many NGOs²⁴. This trust fund of over €4.2 billion²⁵ is largely financed by the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF was created in the late 1950s to provide development assistance to mainly African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The EUTF also funds projects related to border management and the return of migrants; projects whose impact on development is debatable. This raises the questions: to what extent does the EUTF boost development in African partner countries, and to what extent is it therefore in fact legitimate to use EDF funds for this purpose?

Besides, many experts question whether increased development actually contributes to reducing irregular migration, especially in the short term. The EUTF and the Valletta Action Plan assume that migration from African countries in the EU is to a large extent the product of failed local development. Increasing development through job creation etc. would then reduce the number of migrants. Research²⁶ shows, however, that this line of thought is

overly simplistic. Migration is not (only) the result of simple push and pull factors, but also of people's aspirations and capabilities.

Aspirations are based on the desire to improve one's own situation. This can be based on economic issues, a wish to find a better job or seek better education, but also on more social or cultural issues, including a wish to live in a less oppressive environment or among like-minded people. These aspirations are fed by information about opportunities elsewhere; through education, social media and peers living abroad²⁷. In many African countries, growth of such aspirations has been observed in the recent past.

When these growing aspirations are met with an increase in one's capabilities to migrate, the probability of people actually taking that very step increases. In general, the poorest of the poor do not have the means to migrate to Europe. They might go to the nearest big city, but often that is where their migration journey ends. Therefore, increased development now, through EUTF's 'addressing the root causes' of migration, may in fact simply increase the capabilities of potential migrants, bringing the option to migrate within reach of a larger part of the population. It is expected that up to an average income of about \$8,000 per year²⁸ increased development will increase migration pressures.

However, research undertaken by the evaluation department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs²⁹ weakens this conclusion, stating that there is no proof for this assumption. Nevertheless, it also acknowledges that there is no evidence to prove the opposite.

Narratives on migration: opportunity or threat?

The focus on development as a tool to prevent migration seems to conflict with the belief that migration is also beneficial for development. In many African countries, financial remittances – the money migrants send back home – account for a significant part of the gross domestic product (GDP).

This 'conflict' can also be seen in the different ways actors talk about migration, which is largely regarded in antagonistic terms: migration is either perceived as a threat or as an opportunity. Several key narratives on migration can be identified³⁰ in formal documents, policies, statements and so on. On the European side, the dominant narrative on migration emphasises the negative side of migration, underlining the idea that migration is a threat to national security and thus needs to be reduced³¹. On the other hand, the African narrative stresses the positive aspects of migration. Here, migration if well managed is seen as a potential source of development³².

22 United Nations, *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrations*, article 4.

23 Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland voted against the GCM, while Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia abstained.

24 See for example *CONCORD Partnership or conditionality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa*, 2018, https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CONCORD_EUTrustFundReport_2018_online.pdf.

25 In April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1890.

26 See for example Hein de Haas, *Migration theory: Quo Vadis?*, DEMIG Working Paper 2, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2011.

27 Interview with Delali Badasu, Professor at the University of Ghana and Former Head of the Centre for Migration Studies University of Ghana, November 2018.

28 See for example Michael A. Clemens, 'Does development reduce migration?', in R.E.B. Lucas (ed.), *International handbook on migration and economic development*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 152-185.

29 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Ontwikkeling en migratie*, IOB studie nr. 427, Den Haag, 2018, <https://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/publicaties/publicaties/2018/10/01/427---iob---ontwikkeling-en-migratie---literatuurstudie>.

30 Anna Knoll and Frauke de Weijer, *Understanding African and European perspectives on migration – Towards a better partnership for regional migration governance?* Discussion Paper No. 203, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2016. The key narratives identified in this paper are: 1) migration as a threat; 2) migration as a symptom of poverty, conflict and weak governance; 3) migration as an opportunity; and 4) migration as a humanitarian issue.

31 Knoll and De Weijer, *Understanding African and European perspectives on migration*, p. 11.

32 Knoll and De Weijer, *Understanding African and European perspectives on migration*, p. 14.

The process surrounding the signing of the GCM showcases these different perspectives on migration. In many European states, the intended signing resulted in a public outcry. In late October 2018, Austria announced it would not sign the GCM, even though it held the EU's rotating presidency at that time. Other countries also voiced their concerns. Some expressed fear over the legal status of the document and worried that the GCM could be used as legal support in asylum claims. This was the case in the Netherlands, but the country ultimately voted in favour of the text of the GCM. It did, however, add an explanation emphasising that the GCM is a legally non-binding instrument. Other fears within (European) countries included the perceived loss of sovereignty regarding migration and a perceived encouragement of migration. In Belgium, the commotion over the GCM even resulted in the fall of the government.

There are many misconceptions surrounding migration, especially concerning the discussion on the GCM. The GCM does not force countries to change their national laws, but is based on existing agreements. It combines them, to further strengthen global governance of migration³³. It is thus important to have fact-based discussions. We need to know the specific drivers of migration and how they interact. For this reason it is crucial to include African perspectives in any reflection concerning migration from Africa to Europe. This research aims to be a step in that direction. The remainder of this paper will focus on the input provided by several predominantly African stakeholders on this issue during the course of this research.

FACTBOX MIGRATION

- In 2019, there were 272 million international migrants, or 3.5% of the total global population.
- In 2000, the share of migrants was 2.8%.
- African migrants (26.5 million) represent 9.7% of the global migrant population. Asian migrants (83.5 million) represent 30.7%, European migrants (82.3 million) 30.3%.
- Africa hosts a big part of the global migrant population. The number of international migrants in Africa has increased by 67% since 2000.
- More than 70% of sub-Saharan African migrants move within the continent.
- 51.6% of the international migrants hosted in Europe are from other European countries.
- 47.1% of African migrants are female.
- In 2018, UNHCR registered 116,647 arrivals across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. This was a large decrease: in 2015, there were 1,015,877 registered arrivals.
- In 2018, 2,275 migrants died in the Mediterranean Sea, this is one death for every 51 arrivals. In 2015, 3,771 migrants died in the Mediterranean, one death for every 269 arrivals.
- The top three arrivals' most common countries of origin were: Morocco, Guinea and Mali for arrivals in Spain; Tunisia, Eritrea and Iraq for arrivals in Italy; Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq for Greece.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population facts, *International migrants numbered 272 million in 2019, continuing an upward trend in all major world regions*, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *International migration 2019*, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationStock2019_Wallchart.pdf.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Desperate journeys. Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe's borders. January-December 2018*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67856>.

³³ International Organisation for Migration, *Global Compact for Migration*, <https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration>.

DRIVERS OF MIGRATION: WHY DO PEOPLE WANT TO LEAVE?

One of the key questions that this study wishes to answer is: 'Why do people want to leave?'; in other words, what are the root causes of migration? Here, it is crucial to keep in mind that everyone is different and that the drivers of migration differ per person as well as by region. In general, however, the interviewees agreed on one key driver of migration: a lack of prospects in their own country. This section of the study will focus on this key driver and other important drivers of migration.

In recent years, several studies and surveys have been done in African countries into the willingness of citizens to migrate. In 2018, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung published a comprehensive survey³⁴ on youth in the Middle East and North Africa. Interviewees identified migration as an important topic in their lives. Here, Tunisia stood out as the country with the lowest percentage of youth convinced that they would definitely not migrate to another country. 59% toyed with the idea, would like to migrate, or was sure that they would migrate³⁵. In Ghana, numbers were also high. A 2017 Pew Research Centre survey showed that 75% of Ghanaians would 'go live in another country, if they had the means and opportunity'³⁶. On the question of whether they actually plan to move to another country within the next five years, 42% responded affirmatively³⁷.

Looking at those who actually migrate, it is crucial to highlight how the majority of Ghanaians, as is the case for most other sub-Saharan African countries, stay within the region, i.e. on the African continent. Tunisia, like most North African countries, is different. From here, the majority of international migrants do go to Europe. For Ghanaian migrants, the main destination countries are Nigeria, the United States and Great Britain, while for Tunisians key destination countries include France, Italy and Germany³⁸.

Lack of prospects

A key driver of migration is the lack of prospects in one's home country. Both Ghana and Tunisia have high unemployment rates, especially among young people. In Ghana, the Unemployed Graduates Association of Ghana was even founded, whose name was later changed into the 'Association of Graduates in Skills Development-Ghana' in July 2017.

34 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Department for Middle East and Northern Africa, *Youth Study*, <https://www.fes-mena.org/topics/youth-study/>.

35 Jörg Gertel and Ann-Christin Wagner, 'Mobility, Migration, and Flight', in Jörg Gertel and Ralf Hexel (eds.), *Coping with uncertainty. Youth in the Middle East and North Africa*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018, p. 205.

36 Pew Research Center, *At least a million Sub-Saharan Africans moved to Europe since 2010*, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/03/22/at-least-a-million-sub-saharan-africans-moved-to-europe-since-2010/>.

37 Pew Research Center, *At least a million Sub-Saharan Africans moved to Europe since 2010*.

38 European Commission Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography, *Migration profile Tunisia*, ; European Commission Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography, *Migration profile Ghana*, https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/sites/know4pol/files/mp_tunisia_3.2_a4_2.pdf.

Both countries are also dealing with corruption and a lack of trust in the government. In the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, Tunisia ranks 73rd and Ghana 78th out of 180 countries³⁹. However, the Global Corruption Barometer of 2019 shows that in Ghana people think that corruption decreases (36%, versus 8% in 2015). In Tunisia, 67% believes that corruption is increasing, which is roughly equal to 2015 when 64% believed it⁴⁰.

Banasco Seidu Nuho, the founder of the small organisation NASCO Feeding Minds in Ghana, summarised this lack of prospects as follows: 'People prefer to go, because they have nothing to lose'. He added: 'In fact, they do not have anything to gain when they stay here'. This sums up the feeling of hopelessness many of the youth in both Ghana and Tunisia feel, and the lack of hope of a better future in their own country.

As mentioned earlier, all interviewees agreed that irregular migration is due to multiple factors (more on this below), but unemployment and corruption are key drivers according to many. Desmond Bress-Biney of the Association of Graduates in Skills Development-Ghana said, 'Young people migrate because there are no jobs in the system. This leads to high levels of frustration'. Moez ben Dhia, International Secretary of the political party Ettakatol in Tunisia, specified that 'the problem is that people with diplomas do not have jobs'. This problem is well-known all over Africa. Although in general, Africa's youth is better educated than previous generations, the link between higher educational levels and better job prospects is still weak⁴¹.

Not everyone agrees that this is only because there are not enough jobs. Phyllis Agyemang of Ghana Trades Union Congress specified that 'for young Ghanaians, there are many barriers to access jobs. The key one is that there is a lack of information on what jobs there are, where they are, and what skills are needed for them'. Nassima Clerin, head of the Lemma Project in Tunisia whose goal is to support the implementation of the EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership, emphasised that 'unemployment is high among young people, and diplomas often do not match labour market needs'. This mismatch between education and labour market needs is something many interviewees in Ghana also mentioned.

Besides unemployment, underemployment can also be a problem, as it can lead to the impossibility to make ends meet and lead a decent life. This might increase aspirations to migrate, especially if underemployed workers are in touch with others who have better opportunities elsewhere. At the same time, underemployment and an inability to make ends meet can hinder migration. Migration can be quite expensive, and so potential migrants need sufficient means to do so.

Corruption also negatively impacts the vision people have for a good future in their own country. In both Ghana and Tunisia interviewees underlined the low levels of trust in their respective governments. According to them, people do not trust their government to take

decisive action to improve living circumstances in the country. Oladipupo Shobowale, a Nigerian working and living in the Netherlands, saw that in Nigeria 'you need connections to get a good job'. So without connections it will be harder to make it in Nigeria. In Ghana, many interviewees also emphasised the instability of governance, with many policies changing every time the government changes. This creates instability and uncertainty, and weakens the business climate. Collins Yeboah, working for IOM Ghana, added that 'migrants migrate for more than just jobs. They are looking for social interventions, for a safety net, for educational opportunities, etc.'. Corruption and the low level of trust in the government to provide public services are important factors contributing to the decision to emigrate.

In Tunisia, the situation is somewhat different from Ghana. As previously mentioned, Tunisia is the only country where the Arab Spring seems to have produced a positive outcome in terms of democratic developments. However, many Tunisians are dissatisfied with the current situation. There is still a great deal of social unrest, and there are frequent protests. 'It was not really a revolution, but more of an uprising,' is a common way people look at the 'revolution' of 2010-2011. 'For a good democratic transition, corruption within the government needs to be fought first,' added a young Tunisian woman.

However, there is something of a paradox within Tunisian society. On the one hand, the level of trust in the government is low. Tunisians do not expect their government to play a decisive role in providing a better future for them and they do not believe the government when it says it will. At the same time, many insist that government should play this abovementioned role. They want all levels of government to step up and take decisive action to improve the lives of Tunisians.

Restrictive visa policies

Another important driver of especially irregular migration that was mentioned in most of the interviews conducted was the restrictive visa policies of the EU and its member states. In November 2018, the African Youth SDGs Summit was held in Accra, Ghana. Several of the youths interviewed there, who came from almost all countries on the African continent, claimed that it was almost impossible for them to get a visa to visit European countries. They told stories about how they were invited to attend conferences in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and so on, but that they could not go because they were refused the required visa.

The organiser of the event, Emmanuel Ametepey, sees this as one of the key reasons driving irregular migration. 'Too many visas get denied. So if you finally get one, it is harder to return to Ghana, because you know how big of an effort it will take to get one again. So people sometimes stay after their visa expires.' As an example of how important getting a visa is, he also pointed out that some churches in Ghana perform special ceremonies and celebrations for their congregation when someone manages to get a visa.

Mohamed Haruna, Executive Director of Returnees Diaspora Integrated Development Organisation (RIDEO) in Ghana, framed the key question regarding irregular migration as follows: 'Why are they there without papers?' The strict visa requirements and restrictive policies also have a negative side effect that is not always sufficiently taken into account:

39 Transparency International, *Corruption perceptions index 2018*, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018#world-map>.

40 Coralie Pring and Jon Vrush, *Global corruption barometer Africa 2019. Citizens' views and experiences of corruption*, Transparency International, 2019, https://www.transparency.org/files/content/pages/2019_GCB_Africa.pdf.

41 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, *Africa's youth: jobs or migration?*, Ibrahim Forum Report, 2019, accessible through <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/forum/download>.

it risks creating misunderstandings and curiosity. It generates a feeling that everything in Europa is perfect, why would you otherwise try so hard to protect it? As Dutch-Ghanaian entrepreneur Richard Yeboah mentioned, this also ‘increases the status of those who do arrive in Europe’, making it even more desirable for others to do the same.

In Tunisia, the situation is, again, a bit different. For many Tunisians, it is easier to get a visa for European countries than it is for many sub-Saharan African nationals. The Tunisian diaspora living in Europe is relatively big, which makes family reunification and family visits easier. Still, this does not hold for every Tunisian and Tunisians are currently the largest group of irregular migrants arriving in Italy⁴².

In the end, ‘people move, but the way they move is up to countries’, as quoted by Samia Shehab, Program Manager at the global humanitarian organisation Mercy Corps. Even though this quote might seem a bit dramatical, it shows that while it is impossible to replace all irregular migration taking place today with legal migration, legal pathways ‘go a long way towards reducing irregular migration. Irregular migration exists because of the lack of visas’, adds Joseph Teye, Professor and Head of the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana.

Inequality in the world

Beyond the lack of prospects and the hostile visa granting system that are immediately perceived as drivers for migration, inequalities within countries and between countries have been identified as important and popular rationales underlying the decision to leave the country as made by future migrants. Mohamed Haruna (RIDEO) summarised the issue as follows: ‘We should focus more on the root causes which are amongst others the economic imbalance in the world. The world is one, we are all connected. Inequalities thus have a big impact.’

This issue presents itself in many countries in Africa, including Ghana. Shopping at the supermarkets in Accra, the capital, showcases that most products are imported, mostly from Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia, as well as from the United States and Europe. Production of consumer goods is lacking in many African countries, which shows in supermarkets. Additionally, importing all kinds of goods risks making African societies more ‘West-centric’. Oladipupo Shobowale from Nigeria suggested: ‘Africa is a very West-centric society. People want the life of the West, that is the life they see everywhere. Nigeria imports everything; this also influences peoples’ mentality. Nigeria needs to become a producer itself.’

The world market needs a level playing field. ‘There is too much inequality. The prices on the world market can and should be managed to get the right prices for the products,’ said Delali Badasu, Professor at the University of Ghana and Former Head of the Centre for Migration Studies of that university. Alberta Opoku, a Ghana-born journalist in the Netherlands emphasises the role of money flows. ‘It is about corruption and tax evasion and avoidance. It is about the fact that here in the EU and the Netherlands, we seem to believe it is okay for heads of states to have real estate and large bank accounts over

here. We make these money flows possible. Our policies should be targeted at regulating and reducing these flows, instead of at migration.’

At the end of the day, migration is a complex phenomenon. It is driven by multiple socioeconomic as well as individual factors, and all of them are strongly intertwined. While ‘people only cross the Sahara desert out of desperation, the push factors are not just poor economic conditions,’ according to Delali Badasu. Karlijn Muiderman, researcher and former Knowledge Broker on migration, agreed with this line of thought. ‘Lack of jobs is not the only reason. Migration is not something simplistic, but it is about everything. Policy coherence for development can be an effective way to deal with migration – are jobs then the biggest problem?’

For both Ghana and Tunisia, migration is important. Financial remittances make up a significant part of GDP, and the amount of remittances outstrips the development aid they receive. In the case of Tunisia, the share of remittances is also almost twice the share of foreign direct investment⁴³. These numbers show the importance of migration for those two countries, and in combination with other migration drivers explain why so many people try their luck elsewhere.

42 UNHCR, Operational Portal refugee situations, *Italy*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205>.

43 European Commission Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography, *Migration profile Tunisia*; European Commission Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography, *Migration profile Ghana*.

PREVENTING IRREGULAR MIGRATION: WHY WOULD PEOPLE STAY?

The previous chapter discussed drivers of migration, asking the question: ‘Why would people want to leave?’ It is just as important to ask the question: ‘Why would people stay?’ EU policies try to prevent irregular migration. This is crucial, because irregular migrants are often in precarious situations. Migrants can be easily exploited when they take dangerous routes. In addition, they risk being exploited by European employers when the correct papers are lacking, and irregular migration is often quite expensive, which also increases exploitation risks. Looking at the issue somewhat simplistically, irregular migration can be prevented in two ways: by preventing migration and making sure potential migrants do not migrate, or by replacing irregular migration with regular migration. Both elements are part of official EU policies on migration.

Mobility has always been a fact of life. Migration and mobility are not a recent phenomenon. Looking at the African continent, during the pre-colonial era nomads were free to move around the continent. Later on, people mostly migrated in accordance with labour requirements issued by the colonial rulers. Such kinds of patterns have persisted, with much migration still taking place towards resource-rich areas and urban centres⁴⁴.

As early as 1979, member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted their first protocol relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment⁴⁵. This protocol deals with the right of visa-free entry, right of residency, and right of establishment. ECOWAS was a pioneer in this regard on the continent.

Since then, steps have also been taken at the level of the African Union (AU) in order to strengthen free movement on the African continent. In July 2018, the AU adopted a protocol on the free movement of people, although there are many obstacles hindering its implementation, such as limited cooperation on immigration procedures and a lack of mutual recognition of qualifications among member states of the AU. The ECOWAS protocol also faces many obstacles.

Recent EU policies have also impacted mobility on the African continent. While African countries mainly focus on promoting free movement, within the region or within the continent as a whole, this is sometimes hindered by the EU. Through the EUTF, but in cooperation with African states, policies have been implemented that boosted border controls. This hampers mobility on the African continent, mobility that has been important

44 J.W.M. van Dijk, D.W.J. Foeken and K. van Til, ‘Population mobility in Africa: an overview’, in M.E. de Bruijn, D.W.J. Foeken and R.A. van Dijk (eds.), *Mobile Africa: changing patterns of movement in Africa and beyond*, Brill, Leiden (2001), pp. 9-26.

45 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *ECOWAS – Free Movement of Persons*, <https://www.uneca.org/pages/ecowas-free-movement-persons>.

in the past. For example, in the past Libya used to ‘swallow up’ a large number of unemployed Ghanaians⁴⁶, giving them an opportunity to earn some money. When such opportunities fall through and there are no alternatives through regular channels, this might add to feelings of frustration felt by many young Africans⁴⁷.

Movement and mobility are thus important, even though many of the European policies are targeted at keeping African migrants in their country of origin. How can policies improve the future prospects for many African youths? And what do African stakeholders themselves believe to be important in this regard?

Entrepreneurship for a better future?

Programmes financed by the EUTF are targeted at one of the four pillars of the fund. These pillars focus on economic development programmes; strengthening resilience; improving migration governance and management; and supporting improvements in overall governance⁴⁸. The previous chapter identified some of the key drivers of migration. Most of these drivers match two of the EUTF pillars, namely promoting economic development and governance, the first and fourth pillar.

However, there is a great deal of criticism on the programmes implemented by the EUTF in general, ranging from the perception that EUTF projects focus too much on border control to the assumption that those projects targeting the promotion of economic development are too insignificant to really make a widespread impact. To give an example of the latter, many migrants who return from Europe to their country of origin can get some money from EUTF programmes to set up a small business in their own country. This can be of great help to the individual migrant, but often these businesses are too small to create extra employment. Therefore, these kinds of businesses are not assumed to have a great impact on the general economic development of the country as a whole.

However, when discussing how to improve the prospects of young people in Ghana and Tunisia with stakeholders in these countries, many of them focused on job interventions, supporting entrepreneurship and measures to tackle corruption and improve good governance. All of these could be large-scale projects.

‘Create jobs, and pay more attention within development policies to stimulating entrepreneurship development,’ mentioned Dutch-Ghanaian entrepreneur Richard Yeboah. ‘It is jobs people need, not just education,’ added Daniel Mann, Project Assistant at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Ghana. Many projects focus on education, but if no further measures are taken, graduates will still be without a place to utilise their learn skills. A combination of multiple elements is thus required: ‘Market, capital, and employment are needed. All of these now put pressure on the youths in Ghana.’

Banasco Seidu Nuho (NASCO) agreed: ‘Ultimately, everyone is looking to get a job. This is a double-edged sword. If you make arrangements for people to get educated, you should

also create avenues for them to use these skills’. So vocational training and educational initiatives are not enough, if graduates do not have opportunities to use their new skills. This is one important aspect that is apparently increasing the frustration felt amongst many young people: they are well educated, but they cannot find a job at their level. The link between higher education and improved job prospects is arguably weak in Africa.

Another aspect is that the academic and private sector do not match. Francesco Mascini of the Dutch Embassy in Tunisia emphasised that the academic sector does not deliver what the labour market needs. In some fields there are large surpluses of labour and graduates, while there are huge shortages in other sectors. Many interviewees, in both Ghana and Tunisia, proposed to implement some form of thorough market analysis to know exactly what is needed labour-wise. In this way, the academic and public sector can plug this gap better.

Important is also that the mindset of many young people in African countries should change, according to Dominic Agyemang, Director of the Migration Unit of the Ghanaian government. The mindset should be ‘that you can make it in Ghana’. This can help to redistribute money that would otherwise be used to migrate into investment, to start a small business, for example.

Another key driver of migration, as discussed above, is corruption and limited trust in governance. When asking interviewees for potential solutions to this, one said: ‘One solution is to stimulate entrepreneurship. But you also need good preconditions.’ These preconditions are, for example, a well-functioning tax system, stability, but also a good banking sector⁴⁹.

Talking about how to get potential migrants to stay in their country, many of the interviewees used the word ‘local’. ‘The EU should support good governance initiatives. Support districts that deal with high irregular migration with local governance support, and focus on local economic development,’ said Prosper Hoetu of You-net Ghana. Emmanuel Ametepey added that ‘we need to create local solutions, including economic opportunities, awareness, and information’. According to them, local solutions are the key, while the EU still focuses too much on the national or even regional level.

Discussing ways to improve good governance in both Ghana and Tunisia, two elements stood out. The first one was youth empowerment. In both countries, it is quite hard for young people to impact government policies, even youth policies and other policies that have a direct impact on them. Capacity building for young people is needed to ensure they will be able to access the political decision-making processes. Improved knowledge exchange between Europe and Africa might be a good step to achieve this.

In Tunisia, interviewees focused on the strong role of civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with corruption. Claude Ducamp of IOM in Tunisia is hopeful about the role of CSOs. Before the revolution in 2010-2011, CSOs consisted mainly of friends of Ben Ali, the dictator who was ousted in early 2011. Now, CSOs have a strong watchdog function

46 Interview with Mohamed Haruna, Executive Director of Returnees Diaspora Integrated Development Organisation (RIDEO) Ghana, November 2018.

47 Interview with Samia Shebab, Mercy Corps, Tunisia, February 2019.

48 European Commission, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, *Our mission*, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en.

49 Interview with Ron Strikker, Dutch Ambassador to Ghana, November 2019.

which helps people getting more aware of the issues at play. A Tunisian intern of IOM added: 'It is a matter of time. We need to have a chance to make mistakes and learn from them. If we got a perfect system immediately, it would also quickly collapse.'

Towards equal partnership between Europe and Africa

As Joseph Teye of the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana mentioned, migration is about looking for better opportunities elsewhere, but also about alleviating problems and escaping poverty. In short, it is largely about looking for a better future. Dealing with corruption and unemployment is crucial here, but not sufficient. Important in the long run is to additionally create a true and equal partnership with Africa, 'Europe's twin continent' in the words of Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission (2014-2019)⁵⁰. Such a partnership includes more than focusing on dealing with corruption and unemployment.

The idea of a true partnership is also embodied in the concept of PCD. For example, SDG 17 sets a goal to strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development. One of the targets of this goal is to 'enhance policy coherence for sustainable development'⁵¹, which highlights the connection between a partnership and PCD. Although the concept of PCD has been embedded in EU treaties since 2007, many incoherencies remain. EU treaties only mention the concept as something that needs to be taken into account. It does not assert the interests of developing countries to be of the utmost importance, to the extent that they should be put above the interests of European countries, for example.

An example of a policy that does have a negative impact on developing countries is the tax policies of many EU member states. Without getting into too much detail, some policies 'allow' multinational companies that are active in African states to not pay their fair share of taxes in those countries where production or activity takes place. Especially taxation is crucial for many developing countries, because these revenues allow for investment in education, health care and so on. Or as Dereje Alemayehu, former Chair of Tax Justice Network Africa, once mentioned: 'If threefold of what African countries receive in the form of aid is lost through mysterious transactions, then there is no point in saying that we support African countries through development aid, because more is leaking away than coming here. So helping African countries stop this leaking is the best development aid the Netherlands can give Africa.'⁵²

'We, Ghana, are responsible', one of the interviewees of TUC Ghana stated. However, is it not more than fair that Europe should ensure a level playing between the two continents? This level playing field should include an equal partnership that is fair, transparent and inclusive. It is desperately needed; one of the interviewees, Samia Shehab (Mercy Corps), even mentioned that 'the EU is behaving like a dictator'⁵³. The EU focuses too much on

pushing back migrants, without taking its consequences into account nor the circumstances of the countries they are 'pushed back' to. According to Shehab, these kinds of actions create unrest, and when this unrest explodes, a situation is created where even more people want to leave. The risk is that this will in fact create increased migration pressures to Europe in the long run.

An equal partnership would also create space for CSOs in the countries of origin themselves. Transparency of the processes will give them a chance to take part in their national processes. In the example above, a truly equal partnership, taking into account the voices of local CSOs, could prevent these kinds of risks.

An interesting step in the direction of a more equal partnership has been initiated by Switzerland and Tunisia. Since 2012, Switzerland and Tunisia have a migration partnership. In this context, stakeholders meet every year, alternating between Switzerland and Tunisia. According to Sylvain Astier of the Swiss Embassy, this gives them an opportunity to manage and support the partnership. Every meeting also results in a project list of the tasks and projects to implement before the next meeting. It not only outlines what needs to be done, but also identifies how the two countries can cooperate best. This list is reviewed during the next meeting and serves as a way of defining the partnership in an equal way.

With regards to a fair partnership and fair chances for developing countries, the target of spending 0.7% of GNI on development assistance is also important. As already mentioned, only five DAC member countries meet or exceed this promise. The OECD also reports that in general development aid drops, and that a smaller share is going to the countries that need it most⁵⁴. Development assistance is crucial to promote development, especially in the poorest countries. Especially in the long run, development assistance is a crucial element of promoting long-term employment, tackling corruption, and investing in human capital and education.

Access to visas

Again, 'People move, but the way they move is up to countries,' as Samia Shehab of Mercy Corps stated. The idea behind it is clear: a lack of legal pathways increases the popularity of and demand for irregular migration channels. Besides, making it hard to move may also contribute to the unrealistic and idealistic image of European countries many potential African migrants have.

In general, migration is expensive, and regular access to visas can reduce these expenses. People who migrate make an investment when they decide to do it. Like any other investment, they want a return on these investments. Many migrants would like to migrate only for a certain period of time. The higher the cost of migrating, and thus the initial investment, the longer they need to stay to make sure they make a return on their investment. Higher costs for migration, which are (among other things) a result of the difficulty of reaching Europe, may thus increase the length of time that a migrant might need and wish to stay for. Additionally, making it almost impossible for a migrant to visit

50 Jean-Claude Juncker, *State of the Union 2018: the hour of European sovereignty*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf.

51 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, *Sustainable Development Goal 17, Progress of Goal 17 in 2019*, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17>, target 17.14.

52 Interview with Dereje Alemayehu, then Chair of Tax Justice Network Africa, the Netherlands, January 2014, https://www.foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl/nieuws/nieuws_item/t/interview_with_dr_dereje_alemayehu_about_tax_avoidance.

53 Interview with Samia Shehab, Mercy Corps, Tunisia, February 2019.

54 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Development aid drops in 2018*.

the country again in the near future, will increase the likelihood that the migrant stays in the destination country.

EU institutions are already working on visa facilitation schemes with countries in Africa. These often involve agreements on returns. The idea behind return agreements is that only migrants with a legal status, including people who have been granted refugee status, should be able to stay in Europe. However, migration is often mixed nowadays, meaning the refugees and economic migrants use the same routes. Since many economic migrants have no real chance of success in applying for working visas, they apply as asylum seeker and hope they get a chance to stay.

There are however a few difficulties with these return agreements for African countries. These agreements often also include sections on what are referred to as third-country nationals: citizens of others countries who travelled through your country to reach Europe. Many countries are wary of taking these people back, because it is quite hard to return them to their own country of origin. Furthermore, taking in these migrants often create tensions within the country as well.

Furthermore, it is not always in the best interests of the other country to take back migrants. Put simply, the country loses out on remittances that the migrant would send back, plus it might be hard to reintegrate the migrant into society. Also, in the past, emigration for some countries was a good way to reduce pressure on the labour market by allowing frustrated job seekers to look for opportunities elsewhere. In this way, emigration contributed to reducing the number of people looking for jobs, thus also decreasing unemployment rates. Therefore, countries might be even wary of taking back their own nationals, let alone third-country nationals.

In several interviews the examples of Albania and Ukraine were mentioned as an illustration for how visa-free access could work for African countries. Both countries have visa-free access to Schengen countries since 2010 (Albania) and 2017 (Ukraine). Both are relatively poor and there used to be extensive migration from these countries into the EU, similar to many African countries nowadays. However, when visa restrictions were removed both countries managed to implement visa-free access in a good manner. Important take-aways from experiences with countries like Albania and Ukraine are that it is important to always emphasise that it only allows for what used to be a tourist visa: access for a maximum of 90 days within 180 days, and working is not allowed. It is also important to point out that citizens of countries that have access to visa-free travel are, generally speaking, not eligible for asylum requests.

LEGAL PATHWAYS FOR MIGRATION

Legal pathways for migration are thus a crucial part of EU policies on migration. In almost all migration policy proposals a sentence is added that legal pathways for migration must be increased⁵⁵. Legal migration could to some extent replace irregular migration. However, regular and legal pathways for migration cannot substitute all forms of irregular migration⁵⁶; other instruments therefore also need to be used to reduce the desire of potential migrants to migrate.

As mentioned previously, 59% of Tunisian youths and 75% of young people in Ghana would like to migrate⁵⁷. Some argue on the basis of such numbers that legal pathways will not go a long way to reducing irregular migration. However, there is a clear distinction between expressing a wish to migrate and taking actual steps towards migration. These numbers at least show that although legal pathways are a crucial part of migration policies, it is not sufficient and other tools should also be used. Fortunately, this is already mentioned in European migration policies, although the implementation is lacking.

For example, the Valletta Action Plan mentions as one of the priority initiatives: 'Promoting regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries'⁵⁸. The European Agenda on migration includes 'a new policy on legal migration' as one of the four pillars to manage migration better, stating: 'A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows'⁵⁹.

Labour migration within the EU

While this study focuses on economic migration from African countries into the EU, intra-EU migration is also relevant to the debate. Labour migration in itself is also an important topic on the European agenda. Within the EU, free movement of people exists, including free movement of workers. This principle is enshrined in article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. EU citizens can work in other EU countries without needing a permit, they are allowed to look for a job in another country and they should enjoy equal treatment regarding access to employment and working conditions. There can be some limitations and there are also examples of temporary restrictions⁶⁰ when a country joins the EU.

55 See, for examples, European Council, *Valletta Summit, 11-12 November 2015, Action Plan*, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf, and; Rijksoverheid, *Migratiebeleid*, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/migratie/migratiebeleid>.

56 Interview with Francesco Mascini, Dutch Embassy in Tunisia, February 2019.

57 See chapter 4.

58 European Council, *Valletta Summit, Action Plan*, p. 7.

59 European Commission, *A European Agenda on Migration*, p. 6.

60 Some EU member states placed restrictions on workers from Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia right after their accession to the EU.

Much of the discussion on labour migration within the EU is on intra-European labour migration, mainly from the Eastern and Southern member states to the Western ones. In addition, recently more third-country nationals have been entering the European labour market, as European member states are able to set the conditions for entrance individually. This kind of migration brings with it some specific problems, but these problems could also be experienced by African labour migrants and with increased labour migration from Africa.

First of all, not only immigration can have some drawbacks, emigration can as well. In some countries, a large part of the young population, often those who are higher educated, leave to find work elsewhere. In several European countries, citizens are now more worried about the departure of their fellow citizens than about foreigners coming in⁶¹. People decide to migrate for a range of different reasons. Sometimes they leave because they cannot find a job in their own country, others because wages or the standard of living are better elsewhere. Especially in the latter case, this leaves gaps in the labour market in the country of origin.

Labour migrants have a high risk of exploitation in other countries. This is especially so for lower educated migrants. There are many examples of labour migrants being exploited by employment agencies. High expenses for housing costs are withheld from their wages, even when they share a bedroom with multiple people. Other expenses can be withheld as well, causing increased undercutting of wages. Plus, these kinds of housing situations create tensions in local neighbourhoods.

Another important issue in the migration discussion is the effect of labour migration on wages. Economic theory says that in times of scarcity the price for a product, in this case wages for workers, would rise. Theoretically, therefore, economic migration would predict that labour migration creates pressure on wages, especially in regard to lower educated labour migration. Increasing labour migration from African countries might then increase such pressure. As Dutch PvdA leader Lodewijk Asscher mentioned: 'Free movement of people within the EU has become a business model for low wages'⁶². To prevent this kind of theory from becoming reality it is crucial that employers respect and adhere to already existing laws and that migrants and local workers are treated equally.

There is not only pressure on wages, however. Poorly regulated labour migration can also put pressure on working conditions. Having a large influx of people who are willing or forced to work under lower standard working conditions might start a race to the bottom. Even a potential increase of the labour force could make current workers less vocal in calling for better wages or improved working conditions. One interviewee in Ghana stated: 'It is also you, in Europe, who create a market for irregular labour'⁶³. She explained that there is not enough inspection on working standards, creating and sustaining a situation where migrant labour can be exploited. Therefore it is important, as progressives in the

61 NOS, *Arbeidsmigratie in EU: van 'De deur staat open' tot 'Kom alsjeblieft terug'*, <https://nos.nl/artikel/2282999-arbeidsmigratie-in-eu-van-de-deur-staat-open-tot-kom-alsjeblieft-terug.html>.

62 Marc Peeperkorn, *Asscher roept sociaal-democraten op tot beteugelen arbeidsmigratie*, Volkskrant 10 January 2017, <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/asscher-roept-sociaal-democraten-op-tot-beteugelen-arbeidsmigratie~bfe3925/>.

63 Interview with Delali Badasu, Professor at the University of Ghana and Former Head of the Centre for Migration Studies University of Ghana, November 2018.

European Parliament have rallied for, to have strong inspections and a strong labour authority with sufficient capacity to ensure labour laws and collective bargaining agreements are adhered to.

Existing legal pathways

For third-country nationals, some legal pathways into the EU do exist, for example the European Blue Card, family reunification, study visas, and of course through asylum requests. Most of these legal pathways are targeted at higher educated migrants. This is especially the case with the European Blue Card, which has however largely failed so far. Around 85% of the European Blue Cards are issued by one single country, Germany⁶⁴. In addition, the Blue Card is not truly European. A German Blue Card, for example, is only valid in Germany. Migrants cannot use them to work in the Netherlands or Belgium. Nevertheless, it is still one of the key European instruments for legal access for economic migrants into the EU.

The difficulty for European institutions is that the EU itself does not have the full competence to deal with migration issues. Member states have the right to individually determine the volumes of admission from third-country nationals seeking work⁶⁵. Many countries do have their own specific policies to target labour migrants. Since 2004, the Netherlands has its own 'kennismigrantenregeling', a knowledge workers regulation. This regulation makes it easier for employers to attract knowledge workers from outside the EU. There is no specific educational requirement to be able to use this regulation, but there is a wage criterion. Also, the company or the employment agency that will employ the migrant must be accredited with the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security.

Like the European Blue Card, the Dutch 'kennismigrantenregeling' only targets highly skilled labour. To be eligible requires a university diploma or at least five years of work experience, and the salary one will receive should be at least 1.5 times the average salary in the hosting state. The majority of (potential) economic migrants from African countries do not qualify as higher educated. Many African migrants are also not refugees, and so do not qualify for an asylum request. They fall between two stools and thus have few options of migrating to the EU legally.

Circular migration

There have also been examples of circular migration schemes where third-country nationals temporarily work in the EU and then return to their country of origin. These circular migration schemes are often targeted at lower educated migrants. One example is circular migration between Morocco and Spain. Since the 1980s, many Moroccan nationals have worked temporarily in agricultural areas in Spain. At that time they could travel to Spain visa-free. These Moroccan nationals often worked in Spain for a few months, to then return to their family in Morocco and often return again the next year⁶⁶.

64 Germany Visa, *Number of 'Blue Card' holders in Germany spikes up for 25% in 2018*, <https://www.germany-visa.org/news/number-of-blue-card-holders-in-germany-spikes-up-for-25-in-2018/>.

65 European Union, *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, article 79, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT>.

66 Carmen González Enríquez, *Temporary migration between Morocco and Spain*, Real Instituto Elcano, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/riecano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ARI111-2011.

In 1991, visa requirements were introduced, hampering the circular movement of Moroccan nationals. Because of fears of not being able to return to Spain, some Moroccans opted to stay, sometimes without the correct papers. Since then, there have been different seasonal migration schemes between the two countries. Currently, Morocco sends seasonal workers to Spain to pick strawberries. The requirements are very strict however. Only females, under 40 years old, who are married and have children under the age of 14 are eligible. These conditions must make it very unlikely for the seasonal workers to remain in Spain after the season is over.

In 2010, the Netherlands started a pilot project on circular migration: the Blue Birds project. The pilot sought to answer the question of whether circular migration could lead to a 'triple win'. This 'triple win' refers to benefiting all parties concerned; the migrant, the country of origin and the country of destination. In the project's proposal, a target was set to reach 160 migrants within a year, who could work in sectors that are experiencing labour shortages. However, 15 months after the start of the project, only eight migrants were working in the Netherlands. Soon after, the pilot was terminated early.

In general, many pilot projects on circular migration fail to make it past the pilot stage. There is doubt as to whether these projects actually help to reduce irregular migration, one of the key targets of these kinds of circular migration pilots. One of the main challenges is to align the programme with the skills set of the potential migrants. Moreover, the pilot projects so far are too limited in scale to really offer an alternative to irregular migration⁶⁷.

Another crucial factor for circular migration projects is political will. This is one of the reasons the Dutch Blue Birds project failed, according to its evaluation⁶⁸. When a new government came into power, the already meagre support for the project became ever weaker and resulted in early termination. Besides, legal pathways for migration, and especially circular migration, generally have rather negative connotations. Citizens and politicians fear that migrants will not return when their temporary contract or seasonal work ends. This is precisely why the Spanish requirements for seasonal work are so strict.

There is more to the story, however. Both in Ghana and Tunisia the stakeholders who were interviewed mentioned that they themselves did not have any intention of staying in Europe because they are able to go to Europe regularly and without a lot of hassle. Past research has also shown that ease of travel decreases the likelihood that migrants overstay their visa⁶⁹. Stricter policies for migration, or even the threat of stricter policies may have the effect of migrants who intended to stay temporarily, overstaying because they fear that if they returned, they would not be able to come back to Europe in the near future.

The threat of stricter migration policies, making it harder for migrants to enter the desired country of destination, might even increase migration in the short term. Seeing no other

option than 'now or never' some potential migrants will take the gamble and attempt to reach their desired country of destination.

This shows that the focus of implementing ever stricter migration policies might not have the intended effect, especially in the short term. Therefore it is crucial to include more legal pathways for migration. It is also important because in order to reach political agreement on the return of migrants, increased pathways for legal migration must now be included⁷⁰. The question of how to shape these pathways still remains, however.

African perspectives on legal pathways: what do they need

What works? And what do people in Ghana and Tunisia prioritise in terms of need? So far, there have not been many successful pilot projects with a 'triple win'. However, interviews in Ghana and Tunisia did offer some ideas, for example, to increase the number of student visas⁷¹; offering more temporary work arrangements, whereby the employer is responsible for making sure migrants return home⁷²; and more and better information on what legal pathways already exist and what the related requirements are⁷³.

Past research has shown a few challenges or criteria that need to be considered in order for legal migration projects to be successful⁷⁴. First of all, it is important to critically look at whom to partner with. Partners should have 'both the capacity and political willingness to manage migration and labour market needs'⁷⁵. One also needs to look closely at which sectors to target. Labour market priorities of both origin and destination countries need to be balanced. This is in line with what interviewees in both Ghana and Tunisia mentioned.

A key point of criticism in these interviews was that labour markets in their respective countries are not well aligned with the educational system. Consequently, labour markets are also not well aligned with the supply of labour. Critical in their recommendations was that thorough market analysis is needed with regard to what a country requires. This was supplemented by the idea that such analysis should also be carried out in European countries, to see what kind of shortages there are or can be expected. After such an analysis, it will be easier to connect with partners.

Circular migration also often brings with it large costs for training. This may include training to improve work-specific knowledge useful to the migrant worker, but it may also consist of language training costs. Especially in small-scale projects, which most pilot projects are, these kinds of costs can be a quite big part of the investments needed for the project.

There needs to be a balance between these costs and the total amount of investment. One way to do this is to, for example, do a bigger part of the initial training in the country of origin and/or to choose countries and sectors where the level of training or education closely resembles the one in the country of destination.

67 Kate Hooper, *Exploring new legal migration pathways: lessons from pilot projects*, Transatlantic Council on Migration, Washington DC, Migration Policy Institute (2019), p. 4.

68 Government of the Netherlands, *Evaluation of the 'Blue Birds' circular migration pilot in the Netherlands*, 2013, <https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2013/01/23/evaluation-of-the-blue-birds-circular-migration-pilot-in-the-netherlands>, p. 11.

69 M. Czaika and M. Hobolth, 'Do restrictive asylum and visa policies increase irregular migration into Europe?', in *European Union Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2016), 345-365.

70 Interview with Dutch Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, the Netherlands, October 2018.

71 Interview TUC Ghana, November 2018.

72 Interview TUC Ghana, November 2018.

73 Interview Fairouz ben Salah, the Netherlands, March 2019.

74 See for example Hooper, *Exploring new legal migration pathways*.

75 Hooper, *Exploring new legal migration pathways*, p. 7.

Crucial is also to always take ‘the question of return into account, from the beginning’⁷⁶. The return needs to be a part of all the processes, from the moment someone first plans to leave. In the words of Nassima Clerin (Lemma Project): ‘Successful migration is based matching profiles and competences, but it is also about the mindset’. Taking the question of return into account, this also means that migrants need something to return to. ‘What is Europe doing on making sure people are returning? They need to be able to return to something. Thus, for example, set up a factory, train people here, and let them go back to the other factory where they can train others,’ contributed Oladipupo Shobowale.

Increasing legal pathways for migration could, as previously mentioned, have potential negative impacts on the countries of origin. Within the African context, the risk most commonly mentioned is brain drain, where the higher educated population leaves to find jobs elsewhere. For many African countries, this is a potential problem. They have invested in educating their young population, and they lose out on this investment. Additionally, they also lose out on reinvestment by those people when they decide to leave. Some countries, like Liberia, require medical students – who have received education free of charge – to complete an obligatory two-year placement before they can go somewhere else⁷⁷.

Earlier, intra-European labour migration and the risk of it creating downward pressure on wages and working conditions was discussed. Equal pay for equal work is thus the first crucial step when hiring labour migrants. To prevent downward pressure on wages, representatives from TUC Ghana emphasised that governments need to be involved: ‘There need to be proper ways for remigration and employers should be responsible for making sure migrants return’.

⁷⁶ Interview Nassima Clerin, Tunisia, February 2019.

⁷⁷ Interview Jeffrey Dadzie, the Netherlands, April 2019.

DIASPORA FOR DEVELOPMENT

It is often said that the diaspora plays a crucial role in the development of the countries of origin. When we talk about the ‘migration-development nexus’, the diaspora is often vital for the development of the home country. Who make up the diaspora?

Diaspora are migrants, or descendants of migrants, who are still connected to their country of origin. In a sense they thus belong to two or more societies. In Europe, many African migrants identify themselves as ‘Afropeans’, emphasising both their connection to Europe and Africa. These connections can be seen in different ways: through family connections, political engagement, dual citizenship, economic links that include sending remittances to family or friends, or feeling connected to another society through language and culture.

An often shared idea, not only among academics, but also among policymakers, civil society and diaspora (organisations) is that the diaspora forms the bridge between migration and development. This thus makes them crucial actors within the ‘migration-development nexus’. Being culturally invested in two countries, they know specifics on both countries and so are able to embody this bridge. It showcases that remittances are not the only important factors, but that skills and knowledge that are being transferred between countries through the diaspora are of equal importance.

Remittances

Remittances, the financial and social investments in the country of origin by diaspora, are among the most important and visible contributions of the diaspora. As mentioned earlier, financial remittances far exceed the official development aid most countries receive and so are an important source of foreign investment. In 2018, Ghana was estimated to receive \$3.8 billion, or 5.8% of GDP through financial remittances. For Tunisia the number was \$1.9 billion, or 4.8% of GDP⁷⁸.

Remittances also have a huge impact on an individual level. As Fatumo Farah, Director of the Somali diaspora organisation HIRDA in the Netherlands contends, remittances allow families to spend money on education and healthcare. These are major expenses contributing to the development of people. Social remittances also reduce the potential impact of brain drain. Knowledge and skills shared through the diaspora boosts ‘brain circulation’, where these skills and knowledge circulate between the country of origin and destination.

Farah also explained that, at least within the Netherlands, a shift is taking place: the second-generation diaspora is more inclined to invest rather than to send money. The ways in which they can contribute are diverse. ‘At the political level, diasporas can play a

⁷⁸ The World Bank, *Personal remittances, received (current US\$) – Ghana, Tunisia*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?end=2018&locations=GH-TN&start=2018&view=bar>.

major role in relations between countries. At the economic level there are opportunities for investment, and on the social level diasporas contribute to integration, job creation and so much more⁷⁹.

This is positive in multiple ways. In fact, financial remittances to family and friends could turn into a dependency trap. 'As diaspora we should not just send money, but invest and build,' local councillor and lawyer Don Ceder said⁸⁰. Many of the diaspora want to invest in order to ensure their families are independent and to create economic perspective. However, they often lack the information, partners and support to make sound investments.

Yannick du Pont, director of SPARK, stated that his experience was that the best small and medium enterprises in those countries have been set up by diasporas. They 'have a unique combination of knowledge, resources, and local and cultural connections that are necessary to succeed'⁸¹. SPARK works mainly in fragile and conflict-affected states, and Du Pont added that in those countries, the diaspora are often the only ones that dare to invest, as other investors prefer and look for more stable environments.

However, diasporas also run into many barriers when they want to invest in their country of origin. They are often the object of discrimination. In Ghana, for example, members of the diaspora that have given up their Ghanaian citizenship are seen as foreign investors, meaning they need to bring a lot of money into the country.

The choice to invest rather than send money is also influenced by fact that the cost of sending remittances is high, especially to sub-Saharan countries. In 2009, the G8 pledged to reduce the costs of sending remittances. In 2015, the SDGs set the target to reduce the costs to 3% globally by 2030. However, in 2018, the global average was still 7% and for sub-Sahara Africa it was even 9%⁸². In addition, one of the objectives of the GCM is to promote safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and to foster financial inclusion of migrants⁸³. While there is commitment to reducing the costs of sending remittances, there are still major steps to be taken, especially to reach the 3% target in 2030.

It is important to note, nevertheless, that remittances should not replace development aid and other forms of foreign investment. Remittances are usually private funds of migrants. While it is important to facilitate the right systems and policies to allow remittances to support development, they cannot be equated to other international financial flows, such as foreign direct investment, official development assistance, or other public development financing sources⁸⁴.

The diaspora can thus play an important role in the development of their home countries. However, not all aspects of diaspora involvement are promising. Members of the diaspora who return to their country of origin sometimes form a new elite. They speak the language of both countries, but also the 'language of the donor', meaning that they have easier access to donor finances than local organisations.

At another level, the strong presence of diaspora groups might also increase migration aspirations. As Delali Badasu, the former head of the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana, explained, development impacts three things. It improves communication systems, as well as transportation opportunities and infrastructure within a country. As a result, these two improvements allow for a third phenomenon to potentially flourish: networks. Networks are especially crucial in regard to migration. By providing information, invitations and resources, migration is more accessible and often more desirable. It is also in this way that development impacts migration aspirations.

Missing strategy

Although nearly all stakeholders agree that diaspora is a bridge between migration and development, diaspora organisations do not always feel like they are taken seriously. In most countries, a clear strategy for the involvement of diaspora is missing. Farah mentions that 'the Netherlands was one of the first countries to take note of the diaspora and organise projects. Despite the fact that we started a long time ago, things got stuck. There is still no general policy. The policies that do exist are ad hoc, always different and lack coherence'. Implementing such a policy should be an objective for policymakers both in countries of origin and destination.

African countries

Clear political will is needed to implement a good national strategy to engage diaspora. This will create an enabling environment, stimulating the diaspora to be a thriving driver of development. However, political circumstances might make it more difficult. For example, in Ghana, the political system is structured in such a way that after every election where a new party comes to power, there are many changes within the government system. An independent entity that works on migration and diaspora issues would be a good way to foster stable migration policies.

More and more African countries are implementing national migration strategies that are also focused on promoting the involvement of diaspora. Tunisia is an example, although the proposed National Migration Strategy has still not been passed in Parliament. The strategy, however, puts strong focus on the diaspora, recognising not only their important role in bringing in remittances, but also the role they can play in the democratic development of the country. Initiatives and policies like these can help to connect the diaspora, showcasing the opportunities in the country of origin.

European countries

It is just as important that the EU and its member states have migration policies in place that involve the diaspora. Crucial in this regard is funding. Diaspora organisations are often small and lack funds to professionalise. Larger established NGOs could play an important part in this. However, diaspora organisations and NGOs often compete for the same funds,

79 Interview with Fatumo Farah, Director HIRDA, the Netherlands, January 2019.

80 Debate with Don Ceder at Afrikadag, 13 April 2019, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

81 Interview with Yannick du Pont, the Netherlands, the Netherlands October 2019.

82 The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), *Migration and remittances. Recent developments and outlook*, Migration and Development Brief 31, April 2019, <https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Migrationanddevelopmentbrief31.pdf>.

83 United Nations General Assembly, *Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, intergovernmentally negotiated and agreed outcome*, 13 July 2018, https://www.un.org/pgal/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/180713_Agreed-Outcome_Global-Compact-for-Migration.pdf, objective 20.

84 United Nations General Assembly, *Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration*.

which hinders cooperation. On the other hand, it is also up to diaspora organisations themselves to take steps to professionalise. To be taken seriously, organisations need a reasonable level of quality and knowledge in addition to personal relations in the country of origin. Having only a few contacts in the country of origin cannot and should not be enough.

Those diaspora organisations that have become professionalised should be taken more seriously. They need to become more embedded in existing structures, at decision-making levels, policy levels, in NGOs, etc. To fully understand migration, it is essential to involve diaspora to find the cultural frameworks that can shift perceptions on migration to develop better policies. The diaspora are the anchors that can change the dialogue and discourse around migration⁸⁵.

In short, the diaspora should be taken seriously. Of course, members of the diaspora do not share the same skill sets and knowledge. In general, however, many of them have relevant expertise and knowledge. They are often more culturally aware and 'being from there' they can be an important confidant for partners in the countries of origin.

85 Discussion during expert meeting of this research process, the Netherlands, May 2019.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

When in 2015 the large influx of Syrian refugees started to completely take over the European migration debate, it also took over the issue of irregular economic migration from African countries. A political crisis on everything that has to do with migration followed, making it impossible to find effective solutions to these issues, including the regulation of economic migration. Indeed, instead of trying to regulate economic migration, the EU and its member states focused on keeping migrants in their countries of origin by closing borders and addressing the root causes of migration. Development aid was used to counter economic migration, and it became conditional on stricter policies to prevent migration to Europe. This in spite of the fact that, as discussed earlier, the assumption that migration can actually be prevented through economic development in countries of origin remains unproven.

It is crucial to include the voices and input of Africans in the diaspora and those at home in Africa to ensure that European policies target what they need in their country of origins. These voices have nevertheless largely been neglected in the policy making on migration. This study tried to address the question of regulating migration to Europe, taking exactly these voices into account.

Migration is not a simple matter and it does not stand on its own. Migration and motives to migrate are linked to many factors. Formulating effective migration policies means that all these different factors have to be taken into account. The current focus of speeding up development processes in order to prevent irregular migration is overly simplistic. In addition to the question of whether increased development does in fact reduce migration, coherence is of great importance when discussing migration policies. Migration is officially integrated into the global development agenda with the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. However, currently there is a huge mismatch between European policies on migration and the objectives we have committed to with the signing of the SDG agenda. The EU focus is on short-term factors, such as security and economic interests, at the expense of long-term sustainable development and the protection of human rights. Policy coherence for development should always be taken into account in order to properly tackle both.

Furthermore, the diaspora is vital with regard to migration. It forms the bridge between migration and development, being culturally invested in both Europe and Africa. European policymakers have to recognise the importance of the African diaspora in Europe, and use its willingness to contribute effectively. Their impact on countries of origin is enormous. Not only economically, because of the large amount of remittances that are being sent over, but they can also effectively share skills and knowledge between different cultures. This should be promoted and enabled as much as possible through political institutions.

But what exactly should European policymakers focus on to effectively and sustainably govern migration and its root causes?

When it comes to the root causes, youth unemployment was mentioned as key factor in all the interviews conducted. There is often a mismatch between the educational level of the youth and the local labour market. There is a lack of information on what jobs are out there, where they are and what skills are needed for them. Therefore, diplomas often do not match labour market needs. It is of great importance to stimulate education that is actually focused on the reality of the local labour market, so that education contributes to finding better jobs.

One possible idea to enable this is to support universities, universities of applied sciences and intermediate vocational educational institutes to set up auxiliary branches in African countries. Recognise these diplomas both in the African country in question and in the EU. If necessary, add language lessons to the curriculum. After completing their studies, students will be able to work in European countries with less effort, but also have the skills to remain in their own country.

It is crucial to focus on these kind of root causes that Africans themselves identify as being most important. Development assistance then plays an important role. Therefore, we need to return to our promise of spending 0.7% of GNI on development assistance, even when we know that in the short term, increased development will also increase migration pressures. In the longer run, development and fair policies are the only ways to promote employment and fight corruption.

Migration is as old as humanity itself, and the European labour market will always need economic migrants. So even though the EU and its member states are forcefully trying to keep these migrants in their countries of origin, policymakers also have to think about legal pathways to facilitate much-needed migration. The impossibility of obtaining a visa for one of the EU member states makes it impossible for many Africans to reach Europe in a regular manner. This creates misconceptions of what Europe is like and may only increase the motivation of aspiring migrants to make the move, even when the only possibility is to do so irregularly.

European countries should start to think of targeted visa policies, enabling economic migrants to work in their countries and plug the gaps in the labour market. Implement a special type of visa: a job-seeker visa. This makes it possible for potential migrants to legally visit Europe to look for a job. Because they do not have to take the more expensive, and often dangerous, irregular route, their initial investment is lower, which will lower the bar to returning home if it does not work out as expected or hoped.

It is clear that European countries and sectors have benefited from labour migration, but not always fairly. The EU has to make sure to always protect the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same place. This is an important weapon against the exploitation of irregular economic migrants. It also enhances acceptance of migration in European society as it decreases feelings of unfair competition with migrants in the labour market. European countries have to take a critical look at those countries and sectors using irregular migrants

for extremely cheap labour, or indeed slavery in disguise. These practices must always be tackled and prevented through effective policy.

When it comes to the European political narrative on migration, we need to always clearly distinguish between migrants and refugees. Refugees must at all times be able to count on internationally agreed protection. Europe has to stand for these international refugee conventions. We have the obligation to protect refugees in unsafe places on the periphery of or in Europe, where people are exploited and sometimes even enslaved. These things cannot and should not happen. As Europeans, we should always stand up for and insist on protection of human rights for everyone.

Finally, a general narrative change should make its way into European society and politics when it comes to migration. We have to make an effort to talk about this topic realistically and fact-based in order to avoid complete polarisation in the debate. Also, we cannot be naïve. We will never be able to completely shut our doors to migration, but we also can not welcome everyone who would like to live and work in Europe. An effective way of governing international migration can only be possible when thinking realistically and looking at the facts. To ensure not only policymakers think of migration in a realistic manner but society does too, more effort has to be put into enhancing integration and fighting racism.

Policy recommendations

We need to know more about the exact relationship between migration and development. This relationship is not as self-evident as it seems and promoting development in developing countries might not automatically decrease the migration aspirations of potential migrants, at least in the short term. European migration policies should also contribute to positive development in developing countries.

- The EU and its member states need to reaffirm their commitment to spending 0.7% of GNI on official development assistance.
- Policies addressing the root causes of migration should emphasise development aspects. The budget for development assistance should not be exploited for migration purposes, such as border control, that do not have any relevance for development issues. Conditionality of development funds based on migration indicators should be excluded.
- The EU needs to invest in a true partnership with the African continent, where policy processes are transparent and more stakeholders are included.
- The EU and its member states should be aware of the potential negative impacts of migration policy tools and instruments on intra-African mobility. These should be prevented by taking established agreements and protocols into account when implementing policies.

Lack of access to legal pathways for migration drives potential migrants into often dangerous irregular ways of migration. The EU should live up to its promises to develop more legal pathways into Europe. This includes:

- Implementing a thorough economic market analysis, in European and African countries, to determine what is needed now and in the near future in terms of employment. This analysis should also show what is needed with regard to education.
- Supporting European educational institutions to set up auxiliary branches in African countries. Recognise the diplomas in both the European and the African country. Provide language courses as well, so graduates can work easily in the European country, having the right set of skills.
- Setting a minimum quota for the number of migrants in mobility partnerships with third countries. Make these numbers demand-based: link them with demography in Europe and expected economic shortfalls.
- Investing in labour inspections in Europe to make it harder to employ irregular migrants, and to reduce demand for irregular labour.
- Implement circular migration policies which from the start take into account the return of the migrant. Invest also in employment opportunities in the countries of origin, so that the skills learned can be used at home.
- Stimulating circular migration from European to African countries as well. This makes it easier for European employees to temporarily work in African countries, benefiting the transfer of skills and knowledge.
- Including more African countries in visa liberation schemes. Make sure that

citizens of these countries know that these visas are tourist visa and that they are not eligible for an asylum application.

- Creating job-seeker visas for African migrants, so that they can legally come into the EU for a short period of time to look for legal jobs.

The diaspora plays a crucial role with regard to migration. They generally contribute to the development of their country of origin through remittances and/or the transfer of skills. Diaspora can be a bridge between the two countries. Strategies to fully contribute to this are often lacking, as a result of which the diaspora's potential is not fully utilised. Therefore, countries should:

- Embed the diaspora in existing structures (in ministries, civil society and NGOs). Make better use of their knowledge.
- Invest in diaspora community leaders.
- Make funding available in order to professionalise diaspora organisations. Prevent competition between these funds and large established NGOs.
- Create, implement and/or support national migration strategies in European and African countries. These strategies should include the diaspora in every policy that impacts their country of origin.
- Set up an independent institution or agency for migration within the country that actively involves the diaspora so as to secure long-term policy implementation and focus.
- Reduce the costs and difficulty for diaspora to send remittances or invest in the country of origin.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Alberta Opoku, journalist, the Netherlands
 Anna Knoll, ECDPM, the Netherlands
 Awil Mohamoud, African Diaspora Policy Centre, the Netherlands
 Banasco Seidu Nuho, NASCO Feeding Minds, Ghana
 Bert Koenders, former minister of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands
 Claude Ducamp, Delegation of the EU to Tunisia
 Collins Yeboah, International Organisation for Migration, Ghana
 Daniel Mann, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Ghana
 Delali Badasu, University of Ghana
 Desmond Bress-Biney, Association of Graduates in Skills Development-Ghana
 Dominic Agyemang, Migration Unit, Ministry of the Interior, Ghana
 Donya Smida, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Tunisia
 Emmanuel Ametepey, African Youth SDGs Summit, Ghana
 Emmanuel Soubiran, Delegation of the EU to Ghana
 Fairouz ben Salah, researcher, Tunisia
 Fatumo Farah, HIRDA, the Netherlands
 Francesco Mascini, Embassy of the Netherlands in Tunisia
 Jeffrey Dadzie, student, Liberia
 Joseph Teye, University of Ghana
 Karlijn Muiderman, researcher, the Netherlands
 Majdalene Bentaher, SPARK, Tunisia
 Moez ben Dhia, Ettakatol, Tunisia
 Mohamed Haruna, Returnees Diaspora Integrated Development Organisation, Ghana
 Nassima Clerin, Lemma Project, Tunisia
 Oladipupo Shobowale, Royal Tropical Institute, Nigeria
 Prosper Hoetu, You-net Ghana
 Richard Yeboah, Dutch-Ghanaian entrepreneur, Ghana
 Ron Strikker, Dutch Ambassador to Ghana
 Samia Shehab, Mercy Corps, Tunisia
 Simon Rupprecht, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Tunisia
 Sylvain Astier, Embassy of Switzerland in Tunisia
 Tjalling Wiarda, Ghana Netherlands Business and Culture Council, Ghana
 Ton Dietz, Africa Study Centre, the Netherlands
 Willemijn Tiekstra, researcher, the Netherlands
 Yaye Helene Ndiaye, Open Society Foundations, Senegal
 Representatives from Trades Union Congress, Ghana

PARTICIPANTS LIST EXPERT MEETINGS

List of the participants of the two expert meetings organised in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Adri Zagers, International Organisation for Migration
 Anne van der Meer, Foundation Max van der Stoel
 Antonio Polosa, International Organisation for Migration
 Antony Otieno Ong'ayo, International Institute of Social Studies
 Arjen Berkvens, Foundation Max van der Stoel
 Fiona Cook, International Centre for Migration Policy Development
 Frank van Kesteren, The Broker
 Gijs Kessler, International Institute of Social History
 Giulio Di Blasi, Member of Cabinet Mogherini
 Hans-Peter den Boer, Cordaid
 Hedwig Giusto, Foundation for European Progressive Studies
 Imke van Gardingen, Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging
 Joyce Hamilton, COC Nederland
 Kaouthar Ben Guirat
 Kiza Magendane, opinion maker
 Klara Boonstra, Wiardi Beckman Foundation
 Leo Lucassen, International Institute of Social History
 Marit Maij, Special Envoy for Migration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Max Koffi, Africa in Motion
 Michel Foucher, geographer and diplomate
 Milka Yemane, Stichting Lemat
 Rob de Vos, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Roelof van Laar, former Member of Parliament (PvdA)
 Rosa van Driel, Foundation Max van der Stoel
 Ruth van de Velde, Foundation Max van der Stoel
 Yannick du Pont, SPARK



In the aftermath of the large increase of, mainly, Syrian refugees into Europe in the summer of 2015, migration became one of the key topics in European Union politics. Irregular migration became intertwined with the issue of refugees, and the EU started to focus on tackling the root causes of migration. This study focuses on these responses. Are they effective and sufficient, and if not, what can be done to improve EU migration policies? It is crucial to include African perspectives in this debate. African stakeholders know what is happening on the ground and what is necessary to implement effective policies or improve failing ones. This study contributes to the discussion with several progressive policy recommendations that do include these African perspectives. Only with fair policies can Europe be an equal partner to Africa.

FEPS is the progressive political foundation established at the European level. Created in 2007, it aims at establishing an intellectual crossroad between social democracy and the European project. As a platform for ideas and dialogue, FEPS works in close collaboration with social democratic organisations, and in particular national foundations and think tanks across and beyond Europe, to tackle the challenges that we are facing today. FEPS inputs fresh thinking at the core of its action and serves as an instrument for pan-European, intellectual political reflection.

FMS is a political foundation affiliated with the Dutch Labour Party. The vision of FMS stems from a social democratic background with international solidarity as its mission. The FMS believes that the voice of people in developing countries should resound in Dutch and European politics. In order to put development cooperation on the top of the political agenda, the FMS advocates fair Dutch and European politics and organises political debates and public events on international solidarity.

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