{"id":21068,"date":"2026-04-17T10:00:34","date_gmt":"2026-04-17T08:00:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/?p=21068"},"modified":"2026-04-17T11:29:27","modified_gmt":"2026-04-17T09:29:27","slug":"taiwan-verdient-de-best-mogelijke-banden-met-nederland-en-de-eu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/taiwan-verdient-de-best-mogelijke-banden-met-nederland-en-de-eu\/","title":{"rendered":"Taiwan deserves the best possible ties with the Netherlands and the EU"},"content":{"rendered":"

What is your favourite place in China? I was regularly asked that question by Chinese acquaintances during the years I was in Shanghai for the Volkskrant.<\/p>\n

The answer \u2018Taiwan\u2019 produced puzzled and miffed looks. Because yes, of course, according to official party doctrine, Taiwan is an inseparable part of the People's Republic of China. That is how it is instilled in every Chinese citizen from kindergarten onwards. But it is still mostly an uncomfortable topic.<\/p>\n

Taiwan is an island that presents itself as an independent country: a vibrant democratic government, plenty of free voices, serious checks and balances, a military with a fleet of US F 16 \u0301s and French Mirages and even two Dutch submarines - well, that's not what the textbooks in China prescribe anyway.<\/p>\n

When I was China correspondent, I went to Taiwan twice. It's an hour's flight from Shanghai, but as soon as you walk out of Taipei airport you realise you are no longer in China. Taiwan feels lighter, messier - in other words, cosier. Full of Chinese culture, sure, but without The Party looking over your shoulder.<\/p>\n

And there is more than Chinese culture: you also taste Japanese influences. No wonder after half a century (1895-1945) as an emperor's colony in Tokyo. And in the mountain villages that run across the island like a massive spine from north to south, you can see the culture of Taiwan's original inhabitants, who have more in common with the Philippines than Han China.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Chaos<\/strong><\/h3>\n

By the way, I had borrowed the qualifier \u2018favourite place\u2019 from Ying, my Chinese colleague from Shanghai. Ying, daughter of a Party family in a provincial capital in China's interior, was along to Taiwan at the time as an interpreter. She really wanted to look around there.<\/p>\n

She enjoyed the country, the food, the people. So free, so friendly, she concluded after a week of curious inspection. You can just walk into a courtroom, and see how justice is done. And in the parliament building, you can enter the public gallery!<\/p>\n

On the pavement of parliament, we encountered another protest demonstration, in the form of a flat cart with farmers and banners for more support to the agricultural sector. I teased Ying with it. K\u00edjk, Chinese democracy in action - without the chaos!<\/p>\n

Because that is what you are invariably told as a Chinese citizen back home: democracy is a Western thing that does not suit our culture. The West is slyly trying to impose it to cause chaos in order to bring our proudly resurgent China back to its knees. Whole tribes in China believe it.<\/p>\n

Ying, too, sees something to it. Taiwan was her favourite place, but surely the way Taiwanese society is set up would not work in big China with more than a billion people, she assessed, with some regret in her voice. There would only be strife, and eventually chaos and strife. But Taiwan: lovely!<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Under control<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Behold the unique phenomenon called Taiwan: an island of over 23 million people who have been engaged in a pretty successful democratic experiment for decades, in a predominantly Chinese culture.<\/p>\n

It is a vital reason why Beijing wants to seize Taiwan: China's supreme leader Xi Jinping simply wants to control the renegade province, as Taiwan is called. Just as The Party wants to control everything that can threaten its omnipotence, from the Chinese military and civil society organisations to businessmen, scientists, lawyers, journalists and the church.<\/p>\n

The Taiwanese have come a long way. Barely 40 years ago, Taiwan was still a right-wing dictatorship led by the KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek, the generalissimo who lost the civil war against Mao in 1949. With US support, the KMT army troop - two million people in all - defected to Taiwan. The island thus remained afloat during the Cold War years, thanks in part to an economy that made cheap stuff.<\/p>\n

Once the Cold War ended and the US and China managed to find each other economically, liberalisation and free elections opened up in Taiwan. The conservative KMT still remained the dominant party at first, but the opposition was gaining ground.<\/p>\n

This has ensured that the Democratic Progressive Party - translated roughly into Dutch political proportions as a mix between D66 and GroenLinks-PvdA - has now been in power continuously since 2016. This to the shock of Beijing, which reviles the DPP as a company of state-dangerous separatists, with leaders who deserve to disappear forever under lock and key.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Taiwanese president and DPP leader William Lai<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Ban curse<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The DPP has become accustomed to banter from Beijing. However, the government did incur a setback in the last elections in early 2024: DPP leader William Lai won the most votes for the presidency, but now has to work with a parliament where the KMT can claim a narrow majority, thanks to the support of a new third party, the populist TPP.<\/p>\n

The KMT-TPP combine, meanwhile, manages to block all kinds of government plans. Most notable blockade: the proposals to improve deterrence against China by increasing defence spending spread over a number of years by almost 40 billion euros. KMT and TPP think a much smaller modernisation of the armed forces is already more than enough. This would save Taiwan tens of billions, which could be better spent on housing, healthcare and other social issues, said new KMT chairman Cheng Li-wun.<\/p>\n

Cheng is a remarkable new star in the Taiwanese firmament. The first woman to head the traditionally patriarchal KMT, she is well-spoken, media-savvy and, at 56, relatively young. A former DPP student activist, she knows how to hit President Lai and his supporters.<\/p>\n

Cheng became president of the KMT in autumn 2025. She gave her business card in the US foreign affairs trade magazine Foreign Affairs in early March 2026. \u201cTaiwan does not have to choose between China and the US,\u201d argues Cheng, who believes what is needed above all is more dialogue and connection with Beijing. This, she says, is the only way to avoid misunderstandings that could torpedo peace in Southeast Asia, and preserve a democratic society in Taiwan.<\/p>\n

What risks this entails for Taiwan Cheng leaves unmentioned for now. She does not venture to draw lessons from the downfall of democratic Hong Kong, where Beijing promised in 1997 to respect fledgling local democracy for 50 years. That promise has since been expertly dismantled, with the recent low point being the sentencing of 78-year-old Apple Daily media owner Jimmy Lai to a long prison term for \u201ccolluding with foreign powers and publishing seditious pieces\u201d.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Relationships<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Cheng looks past it. In Foreign Affairs, she talks about establishing \u201cmore institutionalised relations\u201d with Beijing \u201cstrong enough to weather any domestic political changes, such as the results of future Taiwanese elections\u201d. This should be done through a \u201ccredible roadmap that Beijing can rely on as a real framework for stability\u201d. That roadmap \u201cWashington and the international community could also support as consistent with their own interests and values\u201d.<\/p>\n

It is of a vagueness with which the KMT can go in all directions, and especially that of Beijing. Cheng has said before that she does feel addressed by the \u201cbig Chinese family\u201d with which Xi Jinping has been trying to lure the Taiwanese for some time. In doing so, she makes it seem as if the DPP is to blame for the heightened tensions with Beijing. While it is precisely Xi who has refused equal contact with the new government in Taipei since 2016, when the DPP took over from the KMT.<\/p>\n

It is also salient that the new KMT forewoman does not mention Japan at all. It is well known that the KMT has traditionally had few warm feelings towards Japanese. Instead, President Lai's DPP government is seeking rapprochement with Tokyo, where new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of the conservative LDP has stuck her neck out for help in defending Taiwan, should it ever come to military confrontation.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Opposition leader of the KMT, Cheng Li-Wun<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Vassal state<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Why so much focus here on the new leader of Taiwan's opposition? Because, to quote a leading Taiwanese analyst, the greatest enemy of the Taiwanese is not in Beijing, but in Taiwan itself. Because there is a good chance that the KMT will succeed in winning both the presidency and parliament in the next elections in 2028. This could succeed in combine with the TPP, with which closer cooperation has now been achieved.<\/p>\n

The KMT can count on barely concealed support from Beijing in its campaign over the next two years. China has a wide repertoire - from military intimidation and economic carrots and sticks, to influence via social media - at its disposal to persuade Taiwan's many floating voters to opt for the \u2018peace\u2019 that only the KMT says it can deliver, thanks to its relationship with Beijing.<\/p>\n

After a KMT victory, China expects to slowly but surely rope Taiwan in, via more and more economic and socio-cultural ties that will make the island increasingly dependent on its big neighbour. It is Beijing's preferred scenario: gradual assimilation, without the need to fire a risky shot. Taiwan can thus be brought under control as a glorified vassal state by 2040.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Democratic chips and drones<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The DPP is working towards a different future: an independent island that can sustain a strong democracy and a strategic economy. That is why the Lai government is tightening ties with Japan, hoping to buy continued US support by building expensive chip factories in the US, and targeting Taipei for more European connections at every conceivable level.<\/p>\n

We ask for support, but we also really have something to offer you, is the Taiwanese government's motto. This obviously involves state-of-the-art chips (TSMC also sets up vital chip production in Germany) but also drones.<\/p>\n

The war in Ukraine has convinced policymakers in Taipei that it needs to quickly set up a large drone industry of its own that is no longer dependent on Chinese parts. Taiwan has a good fine mechanical manufacturing industry that can be used for this purpose.<\/p>\n

The Lai lang government is now allocating more than a billion euros to establish a democratic supply chain <\/em>set up so that in a few years, the EU too will no longer have to shop in China for drone parts. Taiwan already supplied many thousands of non-red<\/em> drones to Europe, which were mainly destined for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Jump<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Cheng Li-wun has now completed her first visit to Xi Jinping. The KMT chairwoman received a warm welcome in Beijing in the first half of April, where Xi received her as almost a head of state and spoke highly of the family feelings that would make China and Taiwan inseparable.<\/p>\n

Cheng enjoyed the attention. She flagged that Taiwan and China have \u2018different systems\u2019 and that both sides should \u2018move towards each other\u2019, without elaborating. The woman, who could become Taiwan's new president in two years, also expressed hope that \u2018one day in the future\u2019 she would be able to receive the Chinese leader in Taipei.<\/p>\n

There are those in the KMT who have their doubts about Cheng's charm offensive. Rapprochement should not become a sell-out of democratic norms and values, they feel. It will be fascinating to see how this debate develops within the Taiwan opposition. In this, the TPP - the Taiwan People's Party with a much younger following than the KMT - plays an interesting role. Although KMT and TPP have made a pact ahead of the elections, they have had a big fight before.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Support<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Whatever government emerges in 2028, the Taiwanese deserve all the practical support they can get from the Netherlands and Brussels. Also - especially - from politicians and policymakers from progressive, social-democratic circles, for whom Taiwan can sometimes still be a far-off theatre.<\/p>\n

Taiwan has had a moderately progressive government for years, and the KMT may lose again in two years. Because the majority of the electorate is not thrilled at the thought of being slowly but surely swallowed up under KMT rule by party bosses in Beijing. And if Cheng wins, KMT and TPP deserve solid critical attention from Europe as they continue to tango with Beijing.<\/p>\n

Choosing Taiwan means not being afraid of Chinese intimidation - just ask colleagues from Lithuania and the Czech Republic how they do it there. And also: regularly go and see for yourself in Taiwan, among the nicest Chinese in the world. Let them know you see them.<\/p>\n

Hans Moleman was a correspondent in China from 2004 to 2012. Now he regularly travels to Taiwan, about which he writes for EW Magazine.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n
\n

P.S. No embassy?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Beijing has been trying to pressure European countries in many ways to isolate Taiwan for years. As recently as last February, for instance, the Chinese consulate in Strasbourg tried to prevent the staging of a Taiwanese-German theatre production, by successively approaching the theatre management and the mayor of Strasbourg with the message that the theatre would damage diplomatic relations between France and China.<\/p>\n

The play, titled This is not an embassy<\/em>, is about the opening of a Taiwanese embassy. It outlines the limited diplomatic leeway imposed on the government in Taipei: Taiwanese embassies may not be named as such, due to pressure from Beijing on host countries. This is close to the truth: similarly, the Taiwanese representation in the Netherlands has no \u2018Embassy\u2019 sign on the door, and no Taiwanese flag flies at the stately building on the Van Stolkweg in The Hague.<\/p>\n

\n

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Wat is jouw favoriete plek in China? Die vraag kreeg ik regelmatig van Chinese kennissen in de jaren dat ik voor de Volkskrant in Shanghai zat. Het antwoord \u2018Taiwan\u2019 leverde verbaasde en besmuikte blikken op. Want ja, volgens de offici\u00eble partijleer is Taiwan natuurlijk een onafscheidelijk deel van de Volksrepubliek China. Zo wordt het er […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":21077,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[373,372,374],"class_list":["post-21068","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-china","tag-taiwan","tag-xi-jinping","location-taiwan","region-oost-azie"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21068","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=21068"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21068\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":21078,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21068\/revisions\/21078"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21077"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21068"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=21068"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foundationmaxvanderstoel.nl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=21068"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}